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SUMMARY
Interference in wireless communication systems is generally thought of as being
produced by an outside, uncontrolled source. With this philosophy, interference must
be accounted for and its detrimental effects mitigated. However, there are also cases
where interference can be leveraged during system design for its own purpose. This
thesis discusses tools for interference design, and proposes new methods for using
intentional interference in wireless communications. First, we introduce two tools
that can be used in system design. We then present two examples of methods of
interference design in wireless communication systems.
Modeling interference in wireless communications can add greatly to the com-
plexity, both analytically and computationally. Useful approximations in interference
modeling, are therefore of great interest. The tools we describe both capitalize on
effective approximations to reduce complexity, while still yielding accurate solutions.
The first tool we present is an approximation of an ad-hoc mesh network of interfer-
ence nodes. With this model, we show how jamming can be used to minimize the
probability that a malicious message is able to travel through a mesh-network of radio
nodes.
The second tool we present is an approximation model of a multi-antenna wire-
tap channel in which noise-like interference is used to generate secrecy. For the
multi-antenna wiretap channel, simply finding the maximum achievable secure com-
munication rate often involves a multidimensional brute-force optimization via Monte
Carlo simulation. We derive an approximation of the channel using random-matrix
theory and asymptotic (in the number of antennas) analysis. We show that our ap-
proximation greatly reduces complexity, and is accurate even for finite and reasonable
xi
numbers of antennas.
In the second half of the dissertation, we introduce two methods of interference
design. Incorporating interference in the design phase of system modeling can allow
for low-complexity analysis. Additionally, intentional interference can sometimes in-
crease secure communication rates and save power. The first method we present is the
joint design of a radar-communication system. If both systems fully cooperate, then
both systems can eliminate harmful interference from the other system. Moreover,
processing redundancies between systems can be eliminated.
Finally, we examine a new method for securing wireless communications. Our
proposed technique combines two previously studied secrecy methods: key genera-
tion, and artificial noise. We show that the combined use of keys and interference
can increase the achievable secure communication rate by leveraging the noise-like
property of key-encrypted symbols. Our results demonstrate that the new method
presented saves power for a given secrecy rate when compared to the original arti-
ficial noise approach. Since both key generation and artificial noise require channel
knowledge at the transmitter, we examine both the ideal error free case and the case




Wireless communication systems are constructed for the transmission of information
from one point in space to another without the need for a wireline connection. The
effectiveness of any communication system is grounded in two metrics: the rate at
which information is transmitted, and the reliability with which the received infor-
mation can be understood. Combining these two metrics yields the notion of channel
capacity, or the maximum rate at which information encoded and sent by the trans-
mitter can be reliably decoded by the receiver. In the simplest model, the rate at
which information can be transmitted reliably through a wireless channel is limited
only by noise. This yields the canonical model for communication
y = x + n, (1)
where x is the transmitted signal vector, n is the noise corrupting the transmitted
information, and y is the received signal vector. With the simple models in (1), it
is easy to see that how much information we can extract from y depends on at least
two factors: first, how the noise corrupts the information, and second, how we design
our input vector x.
We may even generalize the model further to allow for modeling effects of the
environment between transmitter and receiver, as
y = Hx + n, (2)
where H is a matrix representing the wireless channel. Since both the transmitted
information symbols and the noise are random, we can only analyze the effect of noise
1
on the desired signal through statistical properties. Therefore, modeling the distribu-
tions of x and n is critical to analyzing the performance of the communication system.
In contrast, the channel H may be random or deterministic. For random channels, the
distribution influences the system performance; for deterministic channels, how much
information about the channel is known a priori at the transmitter and receiver will
determine the capacity. The general linear model in (2) has been extensively studied.
When n is Gaussian and white, analysis is straightforward and the capacity is easily
found in closed form. In general, it is possible to derive analytical expressions for
most (interesting) special cases of H,x and n.
Noise-limited communication is convenient for analysis. However, in many cases,
capacity is limited not only by noise, but also by interference. Interference is measured
at the receiver, since it is at the receiver that the information must be extracted
from any interference present, and is generally characterized in ways fundamentally
different from noise. It is common to characterize receiver noise is modeled as a
Gaussian white random process. This denotes that the power spectrum of the noise
is constant across all frequencies (of interest), or equivalently that the noise signal
is correlated with itself only at a delay of zero. Interference, on the other hand, is
generally considered to contain some non-random structure; in fact, this non-random
structure not only allows but necessitates that it be considered separately from noise.
Frequency content of interference is generally restricted to a finite bandwidth, and an
interference signal will have a nonzero autocorrelation over a range of nonzero delays.
We can generalize the linear model in (2) to include the effects of interference. If
we assume that there are K sources of interference, the model becomes
y = Hx +
K∑
k=1
Hkxk + n, , (3)
where Hk is the channel between the receiver and the k
th interferer, and xk is the
transmitted signal of the kth interferer. Note that the dimensionality of each interferer
2
may differ from that of the transmitter. Without loss of generality1, assume that the
vector model in (3) represents a wireless communication system using N transmit
antennas and M receive antennas and thus H is of dimension M × N . The kth
interferer uses Mi antennas and the k
th interference channel is of dimension Mi ×N .
If the interference originates from a friendly or cooperative source (e.g., other users
in the same network), then it might be that Mk = M for all k, or at least we might
assume that the Mk are known at the receiver. If, on the other hand, the interference
originates from an unknown (or perhaps even adversarial) source, then it is possible
that Mk 6= M for any k, and likely that the different Mk would be unknown at the
receiver.
The dimensionality of interference channels is just one of many considerations.
To create an effective model, it is necessary to also have knowledge of (or estimate)
other parameters, such as the interference power, interference channel coefficients,
and the space-time-frequency structure of the interfering signals. It is clear that
the general interference problem can quickly grow exceedingly complex. In fact, the
degrees of freedom in the general interference channel modeled in (3) are often too
great to yield analytical solutions. This is evidenced by the fact that even seemingly
simple interference-channel problems require highly complex and involved solutions.
For example, the capacity of the 2 × 2 interference channel (i.e., two transmitters
and two receivers) is still an open problem today, despite more than three decades of
research [19].
As the wireless spectrum grows increasingly crowded, the issue of interference from
both known and unknown sources will become ever more prominent. Interference is
commonly from an outside source, and thus is something to be accounted for, rather
than controlled by, the system designers. When interference from an unknown source
1In addition to spatial arrays of multiple antennas, the matrix-vector system descriptions in (2)
and (3) also commonly represent blocks of symbols gathered over an interval in time or frequency.
3
is present, there are three main strategies [8]. First, if interference is weak compared
to the desired signal, the structure of the interfering signal can be ignored and it can
simply be treated as additional Gaussian noise. The effective noise ñ and resulting




Hkxk + n (4)
y(WI) = Hx + ñ. (5)
If the strength of the interfering signal is on approximately the same order as the
desired signal, the best hope is to orthogonalize the desired signal in either space,
time or frequency. Orthogonality ensures the complete separability between signals;
desired received signal y(D) and the interfering received signal y(I) are then modeled
as






where n′ is a new noise term corresponding to the orthogonal space of the interference.
Complete separability is in one sense ideal, since the interfering signal can simply
be discarded. However, orthogonalization requires either moving to a new location,
changing frequencies, or waiting until the interference is no longer present. These
options are clearly not desirable, and many scenarios are not even possible. Finally,
when interference is strong compared to the desired signal, the best strategy is to
decode the interfering signals and remove them. If we define the effect of the kth
interferer as vk = Hkxk, and the receiver’s estimate of the k
th interference signal as
v̂k, then the strong interference received signal y
(SI) is modeled as





where y is again defined as in (3). Instead of jointly decoding the interfering signals
as in (8), it is in practice often more successful to decode successively in order of
strength, starting with the strongest, and subtract the single interference estimate
before estimating the next strongest. In contrast to the weak-interference approach,
decoding the interference capitalizes on the structure present in the interference signal.
However, this requires additional knowledge about the interference. For instance, to
decode the interference with arbitrarily small probability of error, it may be necessary
to have a priori knowledge of the codebook with which interference is encoded.
The word “interference” itself generally carries negative connotations. But inter-
ference can also be a boon. Figure 1 shows an example of how interference design
could be broken down into specific approaches. Though not exhaustive, this dia-
gram is instrumental in comparing the topics covered in this thesis. The traditional
pessimistic view of interference is located at the far left of the figure. However, inter-
ference design can also be leveraged at the design phase of a communication system
to cause a desired effect, either within or outside of the communication network.
Examples include intentionally interrupting or corrupting communication, lowering
decoding complexity, maximizing throughput, or ensuring privacy.
Crowding of the wireless spectrum will also inevitably drive new approaches to
resource sharing between cooperative systems that previously were designed and op-
erated independently. If two systems that compete for resources instead decide to
cooperate and share resources,it is possible that both systems can benefit by elimi-
nating harmful interference and minimizing redundancies between them. With full
cooperation between systems, it is tempting to immediately incorporate orthogonal-
ization as in (6)-(7), since that allows each system to operate independently. However,
even when the interference comes from a friendly or cooperative source, orthogonal-
ization is, in general, a suboptimal solution. For example, strictly orthogonal commu-
nication systems do not exhaust all degrees of freedom available in the signal space,
5
Figure 1: Example interference design tree diagram.
and therefore do not yield rate-optimal solutions. Instead, designing interference to
align into a specific subspace of the total signal allows full use of degrees of freedom
[8]. This illustrates the fact that clever design of interference can actually improve
performance.
1.1 Thesis Contributions
Motivated by the inherent complexity of interference in wireless systems and the drive
to design interference for specific goals, in this thesis, we describe tools for intentional
interference design, and propose beneficial interference methods for wireless commu-
nication systems. Here we are concerned with interference at the physical layer; we
define interference as pertaining to the transmission, propagation, reception, and/or
decoding of the wireless signal. The specific contributions of this thesis are as follows.
1. Tools for Interference System Analysis
(a) Power expenditure in interference networks. The most familiar form
of intentional physical-layer interference is jamming, or flooding the envi-
ronment with electromagnetic energy to prevent reception of the informa-
tion signal. Jamming at the physical layer is simple to implement, but
6
is resource intensive. Power required to transmit a jamming signal con-
tinuously is costly. Therefore, when jamming is used, it is desirable to
minimize the amount of power necessary to effectively jam a signal. In
Chapter 2, we present an approximation model of an ad-hoc mesh network
used to interfere with a signal. This approximation model can be used to
determine the appropriate system parameters, such as transmission power
and number of interfering nodes.
(b) When closed-form expressions for system capacity are not available, we
must often resort to simulation to determine the maximum achievable rate.
In some interference channels, such as the artificial noise secure commu-
nication scheme discussed in Chapter 3, even Monte Carlo simulation can
prove burdensome with typical processing hardware currently available.
In such a case, an approximation method is needed. We present such an
approximation method based on the theory of random matrices, and show
that it speeds evaluation by many orders of magnitude.
2. Methods of Interference Design
(a) Codesign of a joint communication-radar system. In an environ-
ment in which cooperative radar and communication systems are co-located
and operating simultaneously in the same frequency band, for example, it
is possible to design both systems jointly to mitigate interference. Co-
operating and sharing resources effectively potentially avoids cross-system
interference known to degrade performance of both systems and enables
simple linear processing. In Chapter 4, we show the performance of such
a joint system with interference eliminated in the design phase.
(b) Reduced power and increased secure communication rate. Though
constrained interference is likely to be substantially different than noise,
7
interference that is freely designable may not be. For example, interfer-
ence can be designed to mimic the properties of white noise, and thereby
leverage its random properties. In Chapter 5, we present a novel method
of securing wireless communication that leverages noise-like properties of




LINK PROBABILITY IN AD-HOC MESH NETWORKS
Signal jamming is probably the most familiar use of intentional interference in wire-
less communications. A signal is jammed when interference from an outside source
saturates the low-noise amplifier in the hardware of the receiver. This prevents proper
amplification of the desired signal, and therefore the desired signal cannot be recov-
ered. Jamming is simple to implement and broadly effective; all that is required is
a high level of transmitted energy in the same signal space as the target receiver.
However, high power transmission is at the very least quite costly, and in some cases
not feasible. In this chapter, we study the use of low-power resource-constrained ra-
dios for jamming. In particular, we examine how, using an approximation network
of randomly placed power-limited radios, we can use the probability of any one radio
establishing a link to prevent a message from traversing the space. We conclude this
chapter by showing how this model can be used in interference design in selecting
between random radio dispersement and a rectangular grid placement.
2.1 Introduction
The emergence of a number of affordable AHMN devices has broadened both avail-
ability and appeal of wireless mesh networking. As is often the case with wireless
devices, it also introduced a new set of concerns about interference in shared band-
widths. Many AHMN devices offer sensors that facilitate gathering data from the
environment of the sensor network. These devices are generally inexpensive, and
operational straight out of the box, and are intended for varied applications such
as monitoring the structural health of a bridge [10] or home-based health monitor-
ing systems [61]. The versatility, availability, and user-friendliness of AHMN devices
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also introduces the possibility of their use for malicious purposes, such as remote
explosive detonation. In such applications, the ability to interfere with the network
transmission, and subsequently the ability of the network to withstand attempts at
interference, are of great interest.
Recent works have addressed avoidance of interference from devices with simi-
lar hardware to that of the network, thereby limiting the possibilities of transmitted
interference. In such cases, the AHMN may employ a variety of options to avoid
transmission concurrent with the interferer in time or in frequency. However, inter-
fering devices may not have similar constraints on bandwidth, waveform type, power
output or range of transmission. The Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)
is one of a recent class of software defined radios (SDRs) that offer extremely flexible
programming– allowing for wideband interference, specifically targeted waveforms,
and more versatile output power. This flexibility enables a new class of adversarial
interference governed primarily by minimizing link probability in the AHMN.
In this chapter we establish an analytical framework for predicting the probability
that an in-network link exists in the presence of multiple interferers. Through analysis,
we find the probability that a given pairwise link exists in an AHMN with randomly
placed relay nodes. Then, by modeling the successive relay selections as a Markov
process, successful message reception is indicated by the stationary distribution of
the Markov process.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 discusses previous works
that address the interference different contexts of wireless network communication. In
Section 3, we define the model used in our analysis. In Section 4, we derive in-network
link probabilities as a function of communication and interference transmission radii.
We validate our model through Monte-Carlo simulations, and give an example of its
use in Section 5. We finish in Section 6 with conclusions and possible directions for
future work.
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2.2 Background and Related Work
Device designers generally equip AHMN devices with a self-interference avoidance
algorithm to prevent intra-network interference. Many devices with advanced pro-
gramming support may have these algorithms disabled, allowing the possibility of
using identical hardware to interfere with communication. Previous works have in-
vestigated interference that might be presented using 802.15.4 devices. Woods et al.
[96] propose a sequence of jamming attacks and counter-jamming responses, where
the communicator and jammer successively adapt to the actions of the other. This
research is illustrative of the constantly oscillating nature typical of a zero sum game–
the attacking strategy is valid only until a defensive maneuver defeats it. They model
interference in a point to point format with three nodes (sender, receiver and inter-
ferer), and quantify the performance experimentally by measuring the packet delivery
ratio (PDR). The authors claim that their methods yield an 88% PDR, and that the
interferer is left no option that will more effectively denigrate transmission. However,
interference generated by a versatile SDR would not be so constrained in attacking
strategy.
Other previous works have also addressed channel access issues. Stamatiou &
Proakis [79] use an AHMN model similar to ours, and assess network throughput as a
function of self-interference avoidance strategy. They examine the theoretical perfor-
mance metrics for various multiple access (MA) scheme in avoiding self-interference
in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems. Li et al. [43] also use a randomly
placed network model similar to the one used in this chapter, and investigate optimal
jamming attacks in wireless sensor networks where the jamming parameters are con-
trollable. Their work differs from ours in that it focuses on modeling the detection of
interference, which in our model is unimportant. They also assume symmetrical links
between communicating nodes, a simplification which cannot be adopted in studying
directional communication. Khattab et al. [40] consider channel hopping to avoid
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interference, and evaluate the advantages of reactive (in response to detected jam-
ming activity) versus random (without regard to channel activity) hopping. They
find proactive hopping best for nodes with a single radio, and reactive best for nodes
with multiple radios. However, wideband interference might alter these results.
Many previous works have considered the optimal physical layer interference
strategies. Martin & McAdam [52] prove that for an average power constrained Gaus-
sian noise interferer, pulsed interference performs optimally. They show that short
pulses of higher-intensity interference are more effective per unit power than con-
tinuous lower-intensity interference in producing bit errors at the receiver. Optimal
transmitter/interferer strategies have also been analyzed from information theoretic
viewpoint for systems with various constraints. Wang and Giannakis [92] analyze a
two-hop relay scenario. In the case of no fading, they show that the best strategy is
to interfere with a linear combination of the transmitted signal and Gaussian noise.
In a fading channel, though, they prove that a Gaussian noise interference strategy
is optimal even with perfect knowledge of the transmitted signal. Kashyap et al. [37]
consider interference on a MIMO Gaussian Rayleigh-fading channel, and show that
in such systems knowledge of the transmitted signal does not increase effectiveness
of interference.
The wide body of previous research has addressed both medium-access and phys-
ical layer point-to-point interference. However, models of analysis of physical layer
interference from multiple sources are not as mature. We present a here simple model
which has the potential for extension to more specific and complex applications in
the future. Our model is also unique in that we analyze the pairwise link proba-
bility and its effect of transmitting a single message, rather than assessing network
throughput averaged over time. and use a Markov model to gage expected effective-
ness. We consider a network of single-radio, single-input single-output nodes in the
presence of multiple interferers, and assume an arbitrary interference strategy such
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that transmitted signals will be met with interference at all instances.
2.3 Model and Definitions
We are interested in the effects of non-cooperative interference on the performance
of the network. Hence, we assume that a self-interference avoidance algorithm is
implemented that makes the probability of self-interference negligible. As an example,
to avoid multiple access interference within the network, 802.15.4 [30] uses carrier
sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) to sense channel activity
before transmitting.
2.3.1 Physical Model
The transmission space S is modeled as a square of area |S| = w2, populated with
up to N communicating relay nodes n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The AHMN node coordinates
are selected randomly from a uniform distribution across the space. A sending node
cs is positioned randomly along the left edge of the space, and a receiving node cr
randomly along the right edge. The goal of the mesh network nodes is to relay a single
message from sender to receiver through h hops across the network. All AHMN nodes
are assumed to have both sending and receiving capabilities, and are constrained to
have identical power output. We denote the availability of a link from ci to cj as
ci → cj, and a reciprocal link as ci ↔ cj.
The transmission space is then populated with up to M interfering nodes m,
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} whose goal it is to prevent the transmission of the message from
cs to cr. The interference node coordinates are selected randomly from a uniform
distribution across S. We denote the interference from di to ci as di → ci, and lack
of interference from di to ci as di 9 ci. Figure 2 shows a graphic example of one
possible rendering of the model. The sending node is located on the left edge of
the image, and the receiving node on the right. Black squares with white borders
represent AHMN nodes. Available links between nodes are shown as arrows. White
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squares with black borders represent interfering nodes. The grayscale contour shows
the sum effect of all interfering nodes at various power levels.
Note that, for any given realization, the existence of a reciprocal link between ci
and cj cannot be assumed due to asymmetries in relation to interfering nodes. That
is, in a symmetrical link network,
Pr(ci → cj|M = 0) = Pr(ci ← cj|M = 0)
= Pr(cj ↔ ci|M = 0),
but in general
Pr(ci → cj|M > 0) 6= Pr(ci ← cj|M > 0)
6= Pr(ci ↔ cj|M > 0).
We assume the self-interference mitigation algorithm (e.g. 802.15.4 CSMA-CA)
is effective in preventing packet collision within the communication AHMN, and that
all interference arises from interfering nodes. MAC sublayer strategies (channel hop-
ping, packet fragmentation, redundant encoding) for evading intentional interference
are omitted, and we focus exclusively on the results of concurrent transmission of
communicating nodes and interfering nodes. For simplicity we assume an isotropic
radiation pattern and the standard free-space power decay model, as might be used
to approximate a level outdoor environment. We note in advance that whether or
not our analysis could be applied to a fading channel model remains an open ques-
tion. Each communication node has an identical maximum radius of transmission








where G is an attenuation constant which accounts for non-ideal radiation and an-
tenna reception. As an example, consider an IEEE 802.15.4 system where Pt,max =
0dBm is the maximum power transmission capability, and Pr,min = −85dBm is the
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minimum power reception necessary to establish a reliable link. The minimum and
maximum power requirements are set according to IEEE 802.15.4 specifications, and
G = 1.5× 10−4 is defined to yield a maximum range of 60m.
2.3.2 Relay Model
The ultimate goal of this analysis is to determine whether a message can migrate
across an AHMN of relays from a source node to a destination node, denoted by
c1  cN . Thus we can determine whether the source and destination are connected
through the relays by determining whether there exists any fully connected path
through the relays that connect the source to the destination.
To model this, we assume that each relay broadcasts any received message to any
relay in range. Subsequent relays do the same. In this way, all possible path are
tested so that if a path through the relays between the source and destination exists,
the message will be successfully received.
Analytically, this physical-link relay scheme can be modeled as a Markov process
where the probability that the message is successfully received in time step i + 1 by
node c
(i+1)
j , when sent in time step i from node c
(i)
k is conditionally independent of all
















= Pr(ck → cj|ck)
= [T]k,j,
(10)
where T ∈ RN×N is the transition matrix.
Form here there are two ways to analyze the network throughput performance.
The ergodic view of the network involves assuming that every link has a certain
probability of success quantified by Pr(ck → cj|ck) however small it might be. With
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(a) Example network layout.













Figure 2: (a) Randomly generated network, and (b) its corresponding approximation.
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this, the probability of successful transmission after K hops by is given by
Pr(c1  cN |K hops) = [TK ]1,N . (11)
An example T is shown in the top left of Fig. 3. In this graphical representation,
rows represent senders and columns represent receivers. Each square thus shows the
probability of the row node establishing a link with the column node, with black
being zero probability and white being probability 1. The nodes are not allowed to
transmit to themselves, so the matrix is black on the diagonal with the exception of
the receiving node which is white signifying that it is an absorbing state. The gray
values represent the estimated average probability of all other links. This model does
not account for asymmetries in link probability due to the spatial arrangement of
interfering nodes.
The alternative is to assume that the network is made up of connected relays and
unconnected relays as illustrated in the bottom three images of Fig. 2. This view
provides a better model of the effects of receiver saturation by an interferer. That is,
at a certain level of interference power, the low-noise amplifier (LNA) present in any
practical transmission system will saturate, making reception by the relay impossible
regardless of the signal power.
In this case, the transition matrix T̃ is a random variable that depends on the
realization. The elements of T̃ are normalized Bernoulli distributed with probability
Pr(ck → cj|ck). That is
Pr([T̃]k,j 6= 0) = Pr(ck → cj|ck) (12)
and
Pr([T̃]k,j = 0) = 1− Pr(ck → cj|ck). (13)
In this case, the probability of successful transmission after K hops by is given by
Pr(c1  cN |K hops) = Pr([TK ]1,N 6= 0) (14)
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and the probability of successful transmission at any time is
lim
K→∞
Pr(c1  cN |K hops) = Pr([TK ]1,N 6= 0). (15)
Three example realizations of T̃ are shown in Fig. 3. Observe that each realiza-
tion produces a unique transition matrix, and that link probabilities are no longer
dependably reciprocal.








































































Figure 3: (Top left) Graphical representation of the T transition matrix. (Top right,
bottom row) Three different realizations of the T̃ transition matrix.
2.4 Link Probabilities
We now derive the probability of link within the AHMN in the presence of multiple
interferers.
Theorem 1. Let S be a square space with side length w. Given an arbitrary num-
ber of uniformly distributed communicating nodes ci, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . } with maximum
transmission radius rc < w, the probability of link from the ith to the jth node in the
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absence of interference is













Proof. In a square space with side length a, the probability distribution fX(x) of
length X between any two independently and uniformly selected points within the











, 0 ≤ x ≤ a. (17)
For the space S, we have a = w. Since we are interested in analyzing transmission
across an AHMN, we assume that the maximum transmission radius is not sufficient










, x ≤ rc < w. (18)
The probability that the jth node is in range of the ith node then becomes
















Using a similar analysis, we arrive at the probability of link from cs to a node
within S as








Since cs and cr are independently and uniformly placed along sides of equal length,
Pr(cs → ci|M = 0) = Pr(ci → cr|M = 0). For the derivation of ( 20), we again refer
to [53] and leave the proof as an exercise for the reader.
Theorem 2. Let S be a square space with side length w. Given a finite number of uni-
formly distributed interfering nodes di, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} with maximum transmission
radius rd < w, the probability of a point c being free from interference is
















Proof. Following the same procedure as Theorem 1, we arrive at the probability that
ith node di interferes with c as

























Since all interfering nodes are independent of one another, we have


























Theorem 3. Let S be a square space with side length w. Given an arbitrary number
of uniformly distributed communicating nodes ci, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . } with maximum trans-
mission radius rc < w, a finite number of uniformly distributed interfering nodes di,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} with maximum transmission radius rd < w, the probability of link
free from interference from the ith to the jth node is

























Proof. The proof follows from the combination of Theorems 3 and 4, and the inde-
pendence of the communicating and interfering sensor networks.
2.5 Simulation
To verify Theorem 1, we performed a Monte-Carlo simulation of our AHMN for
all transmission radii less than 60m, the maximum radius for an 802.15.4 network.
The results are shown in Fig. 4. The top curve shows the theory and simulation
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Theory, Edge to Internal
Sim, Send−Edge to Internal
Sim, Rec−Edge to Internal
Theory, Both Internal
Simulated, Both Internal
Figure 4: Probability of link in the absence of interference.














































Figure 5: Probability of escaping interference.
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comparison for the case where both communicating nodes are within S. The lower
curves represent the theory and two simulations for when one node is within S and
one is located on an edge, as is the case for cs and cr. The probability is lower for
links with sending and receiving nodes, since their horizontal component is fixed and
thus are out of range more nodes placed on the right side of S. The small offset in
the simulated values may be due to quantizing S into a grid of points instead of a
considering it a continuous space. We verified Theorem 2 in a similar manner. The
results are shown in Fig. 5. The probability of link decreases with each additional
interfering node placed in S. However, as the space becomes more saturated, the
placing additional interfering nodes begins to show diminishing returns. We now
follow with an example of how this modeling of AHMN might be useful in practice.
2.5.1 Example: Effects of Node Density and Spatial Arrangement
In designing a system to interfere with an AHMN, two central considerations are
interfering node density and node layout. As an example scenario, consider a situation
where the goal is to jam a AHMN with exactly M jammer nodes. To achieve the
objective of maximum jamming efficiency, we must first determine should the jamming
nodes be spatially organized. We consider two options: place the jammers on a
rectangular grid or place the jammers randomly. The former placement is more
intuitively appealing and does provide better performance for some values of M . In
contrast, random jammer placement may be easier to deploy by, for instance, dropping
the jammer node out of a plane.
We simulate this scenario, and keep the number of AHMN nodes constant as
we vary the size of the space S and the number of interfering nodes M . Fig. 6
shows Monte-Carlo simulation results for two runs, each with N = 15 AHMN re-
lay nodes. In the top figure, S has side length 140m, while in the bottom figure
the length is increased to 260m.Two different interfering node layouts are tested: a
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randomly assigned layout, and a square grid layout. We assume the interferer has
control of node placement, and thus can select the better arrangement once it is
known. The graphs trace expected probability of transmission through the network.
At low AHMN densities, the performance of the grid and random layouts are similar,
and overall probability is reduced.This matches intuition, since in sparser networks
the link probability is diminished, and a grid layout of interfering nodes is likely to
cover a similar amount of territory as the random layout. As the densities are in-
creased, however, we see the curves begin to differentiate. Now, there are regions
where the random placement performs better than the grid layout, and vice versa.
If the interferer is more constrained by number of nodes, a grid spacing will more
effectively disrupt transmission. However, as interfering nodes increase, likelihood of
transmission is depleted more quickly with a random arrangement.
2.6 Discussion
In this chapter we present a closed-form expression for the probability of pairwise
AHMN node link in the presence multiple interferes. We then show through Monte-
Carlo simulation that a simple binary Markov model accurately approximates these
link probabilities. We have also demonstrated an example application for how the
model might be useful in AHMN network design. The models presented here are a first
step in a novel approach to modeling AHMNs. Though this first model is somewhat
simplistic, it nonetheless is able to account for non-reciprocal pairwise link probability.
Future iterations could tailor the model to more specific needs and research areas.
Possible extensions might include assessing the effects of additive noise, incorporating
indoor or urban fading characteristics into the transmission model, and accounting
for contour created by summation of interference signals.
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LARGE-SCALE MIMO APPROXIMATION FOR
ARTIFICIAL NOISE
In Chapter 2, we modeled our interference radio transmitters with a simple isotropic
radiation. With multi-antenna transmission, it is possible to weight the signals trans-
mitted by each antenna to direct energy more effectively. This enables new possi-
bilities for interference design over the single-antenna case, in particular with regard
to secure communication. Given sufficient transmit antennas, signal energy can be
directed toward, and interference can be directed away from, the intended receiver.
Maximizing achievable secure communication rates with this technique involves opti-
mization over multiple variables, and is in general a non-convex problem. Therefore,
researchers often resort to brute-force search for optimum values using Monte Carlo
simulation.
Even with standard computational power growing continuously and quickly as it
has in recent decades, these optimizations can still prove cumbersome and time con-
suming as a result of the number of variables involved. Therefore, in this chapter,
we present a tool useful in interference design which approximates the interference
channel. This approximation uses random matrix theory, and assumes that all parties
are equipped with infinite antennas. Although such an assumption seems unreason-
able, we show that the approximation remains accurate even for small numbers of
antennas. The approximation tool is shown to speed calculation of rates achievable
with optimal values by orders of magnitude over Monte Carlo simulation.
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3.1 Introduction
In 1975, Aaron Wyner defined the secrecy capacity for a three-terminal system with a
transmitter, intended receiver, and eavesdropper, called the “wiretap channel”. The
secrecy capacity is the maximum reliable rate of communication between transmitter
and intended receiver, with the eavesdropper unable to glean any information from the
message [97]. In a discrete memoryless channel where the eavesdropper’s channel is
degraded with respect to the main channel (e.g. the eavesdropper channel is noisier),
[97] showed that the secrecy capacity is strictly positive. This result is based on wired
communication, where it is reasonable to assume that an eavesdropper tapping the
line would receive a degraded copy of message arriving at the intended receiver.
The notion of secrecy capacity was extended first to the broadcast discrete-memoryless
channel in [15], and subsequently generalized to the Gaussian wiretap channel in [42].
The basic results of these works are analogous to the wired case: the secrecy capacity
is strictly positive whenever the eavesdropper channel is in some sense “worse” than
the main channel. In a wireless communication system, an eavesdropper located fur-
ther from the transmitter than the intended receiver is likely to have a noisier channel
simply by the properties of free-space propagation loss. It was shown in [2, 6] that in
rich-scattering multipath channels, the ergodic secrecy capacity is nonzero even when
the SNR at the Ex exceeds that at the Rx. However, if the eavesdropper’s location is
unknown a priori, the relative channel quality cannot be guaranteed. However, if the
transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas outnumbering the number of antennas
at the receiver and eavesdropper, then it is possible to devote a portion of available
power to transmitting noise in all directions away from the intended receiver, and
thereby artificially degrade the eavesdropper channel regardless of its exact location.
This method of securing communication was first put forth in [21, 22] and is termed
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artificial noise (AN) 1. With accurate channel knowledge at the transmitter, singular-
value decomposition (SVD) can be used to transform a general MIMO channel into a
set of parallel independent channels. To preclude adding noise to the main channel,
message and AN symbols are precoded with right singular vectors corresponding to
nonzero and zero singular values, respectively. The transmitter can thus simultane-
ously transmit message symbols to the intended receiver and direct AN symbols in
the direction of any potential eavesdroppers. An eavesdropper’s only choice is then
to attempt to increase SNR by physically approaching the Tx. However, at high SNR
the eavesdropper’s gains saturate while those of the main channel continue increas-
ing, thereby guaranteeing a positive secrecy capacity is attainable regardless of the
eavesdropper’s proximity to the Tx.
Other works have also investigated the AN strategy from a number of different
perspectives. Khisti and Wornell [41] first explored the use of AN for the the deter-
ministic multiple-input single-output multiple-eavesdrop (MISOME) wiretap channel,
and showed that the AN method yields a rate asymptotically (in power) near secrecy
capacity. Zhou and McKay [105] derived closed-form lower bounds for the achievable
secrecy rate for the multiple-input single-output single-eavesdrop (MISOSE) fading
channel, for the MISOSE channel with multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers oper-
ating independently, and for the MISOSE channel with multiple eavesdroppers in
collusion, which can be considered equivalent to the MISOME case. Optimal power
allocation between the information signal and AN has also been previously studied.
For the MISOSE channel with multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers, it is shown in
[105] that splitting power equally between information and AN signals yields near-
optimal performance; however, as eavesdroppers are allowed to collude, more power
1Although [21] uses the term secrecy capacity in reference to the maximum secret rate as the
artificial noise secrecy capacity, artificial noise is strictly suboptimal and thus cannot achieve the
secrecy capacity. Therefore, in this dissertation we use the term secrecy rate.
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should be devoted to AN as the number of eavesdroppers grows. In [63], power al-
location and AN in an orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) system
are analyzed, and it is shown that frequency-domain AN is insufficient to guarantee
secrecy; rather, a time-domain AN signal must be superimposed.
In [103] a wiretap code is adaptively optimized given a low-rate instantaneous
channel state information (CSI) feedback signal from the receiver. Most previous
studies of AN assume that, while the exact eavesdropper channel is unknown, the
statistics of the eavesdropper are known at the transmitter. In contrast, [58] consid-
ers the case where no information about the eavesdropper channel is available, and
analyses the achievable secrecy rate using a signal to interference plus noise (SINR)
metric. To effectively steer AN and signal into orthogonal spaces, the transmitter
is commonly assumed to posses accurate CSI. The effect of imperfect CSI at the
transmitter (and subsequent noise leakage into the main channel) is considered in
[58, 46, 44]; imperfect CSI at the receiver is considered in [98]. In [69], power alloca-
tion is considered from an outage probability perspective for the MISO case.
In [45], the authors generalize the artificial noise framework to allow transmission
of AN power into the main channel for the special MISOSE case where the transmitter
may have multiple antennas but the intended receiver and the eavesdropper are each
equipped with only a single antenna. Their analysis shows that, contrary to intuition,
the optimal beamforming matrix does not strictly limit the AN transmitted to the
null space of the main channel; rather, modest secrecy gains can be achieved in lower
SNR regions where the zero-forcing solution yields zero secrecy capacity. However,
as the number of antennas increases, this generalized approach quickly converges
to the orthogonal approach of precoding with right singular vectors in [21]. The
difference also diminishes, albeit more slowly, with increases in SNR. Since the returns
from optimizing as in [45] diminish quickly, and complexity is substantially increased




Calculating secrecy capacity involves expectation over random channel gains via
Monte-Carlo simulation, followed by optimization over both antenna and power al-
location variables. The complexity involved with this task makes it unfeasible for
resource-constrained or adaptive systems. Moreover, the solution is applicable only
for the specific number of antennas at Tx, Rx, and Ex for which it is generated.
Comparing a chosen implementation to the maximum achievable involves either gen-
eration and storage of large lookup tables or simulation for each tested configuration.
Our objective in this chapter is to develop a method of approximating the AN secrecy
capacity presented in [21] that:
1. is closed form,
2. is accurate and useful for realistic power levels and numbers of antennas,
3. generalizes the channel model to include arbitrary independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) channels, and
4. does not weaken security by overestimating the rate at which secret communi-
cation is possible.
We show here that an approximation method meeting these criteria is possible by
applying large-scale MIMO analysis techniques, and recent results from random ma-
trix theory. A critical estimate is the worst-case eavesdropper capacity; this quantity
is an upper bound on the amount of information that an eavesdropper may be able
to decode. By reformulating the eavesdropper capacity as a multiuser interference
problem, we show that a very accurate estimate is obtained by finding the zeros of a
decoupled set of 2nd and 3rd-order polynomials.
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We then provide a novel, closed-form heuristic method of estimating the main-
channel capacity with a modified asymptotic large-scale MIMO expression. This
closed-form approximation is shown to perform well for cases of interest. Moreover,
the complexity is unaffected by increases in number of antennas, which can quickly
lead to dramatic increases computational complexity in Monte-Carlo simulations.
Recent studies have used random matrix theory to characterize the per receive antenna
capacity of MIMO systems by looking at the asymptotic large-antenna limit. Central
to this theory is the idea that, in a MIMO system with t Tx antennas and r Rx
antennas, the eigenvalues of many classes of random matrices converge almost surely
to a non-random limit as t, r →∞ with the ratio t/r → β [85]. Large-scale analysis
in such systems is often able to yield closed-form expressions, or greatly-reduced
complexity solutions, for capacity in lieu of Monte-Carlo simulations. These solutions
have been shown to be quite accurate even for realistically deployable finite numbers
of antennas.
In [47], the asymptotic capacity of MIMO systems in the presence of multiple-
antenna interferers is derived. While a closed-form solution is not possible in general
(with the exception of the special case of equal number of antennas for all interfering
and desired users), the capacity equation for a MIMO system with K interferers
involves solving only a decoupled set of polynomials of order K + 2 and K + 1. We
will demonstrate that the eavesdropper capacity required to determine the minimum
guaranteed secrecy capacity in an AN system can be accurately represented within
this multiple-antenna interferer framework. The approximation becomes tight for the
assumed worst-case scenario of interest where Eve maximizes her SNR by physically
moving herself very close to the Tx.
The large-antenna asymptotic capacity of a MIMO channel with full CSIT is
derived in closed form in [86]. With AN secrecy assuming CSIT, these asymptotic
techniques can be used to arrive at an approximation for the main channel capacity.
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However, a key assumption in [86] is that SNR is sufficient such that all available
spatial eigenmodes are utilized in the waterfilling power allocation. For the case of
AN secrecy, a portion of the spatial dimensions available for signal transmission may
be allocated instead to artificial noise transmission.
The asymptotic solutions we present in this chapter contribute to existing works
in that they:
1. Extend previous asymptotic formulas to the MIMOME case and effectively
incorporate the eigenmode partitioning central to AN secrecy methods;
2. Greatly reduce complexity (the eavesdropper channel is a solution of polynomial
equations, while the main channel solution is closed-form) and demonstrate
bounded error;
3. Apply to a more general channel model and thus depend only on parameters
controllable at the transmitter; and
4. Yield more accurate results over SNRs of interest than previous approxima-
tion methods for the non-asymptotic cases (i.e. realizable number of antennas)
tested.
3.2 System Model
We consider the standard MIMO wiretap channel, with t, r, and e antennas at
transmitter Alice (Tx), receiver Bob (Rx) and eavesdropper Eve (Ex), respectively.
H ∈ Cr×t is the MIMO main (Alice-Bob) channel matrix, and G ∈ Ce×t is the MIMO
eavesdropper (Alice-Eve) channel matrix. We assume a rich scattering environment,
and assume both channels to be slow flat-fading such that the channel is constant for
the duration of the channel estimation and subsequent code word transmission. Thus
the entries of H are i.i.d. complex Gaussian distributed. For comparison of antenna
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configurations, we normalize the channel entries to have unit variance such that the
average received SNR is independent of number of transmit antennas.
Following the MIMO AN procedure set forth in [21], Alice may attempt to give
Bob a relative SNR advantage over Eve by broadcasting noise in the null space of
Bob’s channel. Alice and Bob first estimate the channel, and use singular value
decomposition (SVD) to arrive at H = UΣV†, where † denotes the Hermitian trans-
pose. Assuming t > r, there are a maximum of r dimensions on which Alice may
transmit message symbols to Bob. However, Alice must have at least e+ 1 degrees of
freedom available to devote to the AN symbols so that Eve is not able to overcome the
added noise through linear combining. Alice chooses AN dimensions da ≥ e, signal
dimensions ds = min(r, t− e), with ds + da ≤ t, and forms combined message symbol




Alice chooses the precoding matrix to be a subset of vectors from the right singular
vector matrix, split by columns according to number of signal and noise dimensions
as V = [Vs Va]. The transmitted vector is thus x = [Vs Va]w. The received vectors




Hx + U†dsnm (26)
= Σdsws + ñm (27)
ye = Gx + ne (28)
= GVsws + GVawa + ne, (29)





ñmIm}) are AWGN vectors at Rx and Ex, with the elements of ñm
distributed identically to those of nm since U is unitary. By Tx precoding with V
and Rx processing with U, Alice and Bob effectively turn the main channel into a
bank of ds parallel Gaussian channels, and, since the columns V are orthogonal, steer
the noise into the null of the main channel. Eve, ignorant of V and U, is unable
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to avoid the effects of the added noise so long as her channel matrix entries are not
strongly correlated with Bob’s; this condition is commonly assumed to be true in a
rich-scattering environment when Eve’s distance from Bob exceeds a half-wavelength.
Alice may optimize secrecy by allocating power selectively to message and AN
symbols. Defining message signal power Ps = E[w
†
sws], and AN signal power Pa =
E[w†awa], the total transmit power is constrained to Ps+Pa ≤ P . For a given Ps, Alice
chooses the signal covariance matrix Rs = E[wsw
†
s] through standard waterfilling [23].
Since G is unknown to Alice, the noise covariance matrix Ra = E[waw
†
a] is chosen as
the scaled identity matrix.
The secrecy capacity of a three-party eavesdropper channel the non-negative max-




[I(ym; x)− I(ye; x)]+, (30)
where p(x) is the input distribution of the message, I(t; u) is the mutual information
between vectors t and u, and [x]+ = max(0, x). Assuming the channel transition
probabilities are weakly symmetric, the secrecy capacity becomes the positive dif-
ference of main and eavesdropper channel capacities, Csec = (CB − CE)+. If the
eavesdropper channel is noisier than the main channel, then Csec = CB −CE. When
AN is employed, the eavesdropper channel capacity can on average always be de-
graded to a value below that of the main channel capacity, guaranteeing a strictly
positive ergodic secrecy capacity even when the Eve’s received SNR is greater than




EG,H[I(ym; x)− I(ye; x)], (31)
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where
D = {(ds, da) : da ≥ e, ds ≤ r, ds + da ≤ t} (32)
P = {(Ps, Pa) : Ps + Pa ≤ P} (33)
are the sets of dimension pairs and power-allocation pairs, respectively, that meet the
AN problem requirements. Since the proximity of a passive Ex to the Tx is in general
unknown, the ergodic minimum guaranteed secrecy capacity is often characterized by


























where σ2nm = 1 and a mutual-information-maximizing Gaussian signaling alphabet
have been assumed.
We note that, in contrast to [45], our work is similar to [21] in that we require all
AN to be transmitted in the null-space of the main channel, and the equations we
derive may thus be suboptimal with regards to the rates they generate. However, the
advantage gained by this relaxation diminishes quickly with increases in Tx antennas;
the effect is most noticed with two transmit antennas, and with only four antennas
at Tx the secrecy capacity is nearly identical to the zero-forcing approach. Besides
diminishing returns, there are numerous other reasons to limit AN to the null-space of
the main channel, the most salient of which is to avoid solving another optimization
problem for each iteration of the capacity calculation. Thus, while optimal transmit
covariance matrix for the MIMOME case remains an open problem, from here forward
we assume that the number of antennas at Tx to be four at a minimum, and we use
the term “secrecy capacity” assuming AN is transmitted only in the null space of the
main channel.
34
3.3 Large-Scale MIMO Analysis
Since the secrecy capacity (31) is in general non-convex, both rates must be calculated
once for each point in D and P . The number of acceptable dimension pairs |D| is
predetermined by the MIMO antenna configuration, while the number of acceptable
power-allocation pairs |P| will depend on the resolution chosen. After these 2(|D| ×
|P|) rates are calculated, the maximum can be found via exhaustive search. It is
easily seen that the size of the search space can quickly grow large as number of
antennas increase or desired resolution decreases. Therefore an efficient method of
calculating the Rx and Ex rates is of great interest in any system, particularly those
that may be resource-constrained or adaptive in time.
We now present the main results of this chapter by deriving accurate, low-complexity
approximations to the minimum-guaranteed secrecy capacity for the MIMOME case.
We proceed by analyzing the Ex and Rx terms in (34) independently. This produces
values for the respective communication rates achieved by Bob and Eve,
RB = I(ym,x), and R
E = I(ye,x). (35)
The procedure for calculation of these rates is as follows. First, we reformulate the
eavesdropper channel into a multiuser interference framework to allow for partitioning
of eigenmodes, and approximate using large-scale asymptotic analysis results from
random matrix theory. We show also that a reduction in search space is possible with
this new approach. Next, we provide a heuristic approach to modify existing main-
channel capacity methods which is simple, intuitive, and accounts for the necessary
eigenmode partitioning. With closed-form solutions for both Ex and Rx channels,
the secrecy capacity is then easily and quickly approximated.
We note that a large-scale analysis is included in [21] which defines the mini-
mum guaranteed secrecy capacity in terms of the expectation of eigenvalues of the
eavesdropper channel. This expectation is evaluated via numerical integration of a
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partitioned and weighted probability density function (PDF) of the eigenvalues of
a Wishart channel-covariance matrix. However, the large-scale MIMO approxima-
tion we present here circumvents the expectation process altogether, allowing for a
closed-form expression and even further reduction in computational complexity.
We now provide an approximation to the first term in (31). Whereas non-
asymptotic capacities require specific number of antennas at Tx, Rx and Ex, we
require only that the ratios of antennas is held constant and allow the number of
antennas to grow without bound. Since the AN symbols transmitted can be chosen
to be independent of all message symbols, we can view the AN as though it were
actually message symbols coming from an outside interfering user. Thus, the Ex will
observe ds message symbols from the Tx, corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) and da message symbols from a theoretical unknown user. We will use this




3.3.1 Existing Asymptotic Capacity Results
In approximating the secrecy capacity generated by AN, we will make use of the
following Lemmas:
Lemma 1. [74] For an m× n MIMO wireless communication channel G with i.i.d.












where expectation is over the random channel gains G, can be written in per-receive-



















where expectation is over the eigenvalues of Q, denoted λ(Q), and η ∈ [0, 1] satisfies







Lemma 2. [47] In a m × n MIMO communication channel G0 with signal to addi-
tive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) ratio SNR in the presence of interference from
k = 1 . . . K outside interferers, each with signal-to-interference ratio SIRk and mk
































with expectation over the random channel gains. After defining the block matrices:
G2 = [G1 G2 . . . GK ] , (41)





Θ1 0 . . . 0
0 m
m2SIR2
Θ2 . . . 0
...
...
. . . 0





























Let m,n→∞, β → m/n, and let mk →∞, βk = mk/n for k = 1 . . . K. Then, using













































+ (η2 − 1)log2(e), (49)


























expectations are taken with respect to B1 and B2, random variables distributed as the
respective asymptotic empirical eigenvalue distributions of matrices B1 and B2, Θ
is the transmit covariance matrix of the desired user, Θk is the transmit covariance
matrix of the kth interferer, and 0 denotes an all-zero matrix.
Lemma 3. [86] Assume an r × t MIMO channel with t > r, i.i.d. channel entries,
transmit power P, and full channel state information at the transmitter. Let t, r →∞,
and t/r → β. Then, for P sufficient to waterfill over all r eigenmodes, a closed-form
solution for the asymptotic per-antenna channel capacity is given as












3.3.2 Large-Scale MIMO Eavesdropper Capacity Approximation
Lemmas 1 and 2 will form the foundation for our eavesdropper channel approximation.
However, these Lemmas cannot directly be applied as is since they make no allowance
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Table 1: Variables and definitions.
Variable (units) Definition
ds (dimensions) eigenmodes devoted to signal transmission
da (dimensions) eigenmodes devoted to AN transmission
α (unitless) proportion of total power devoted to signal
β (unitless) Tx antenna to Rx antenna ratio
γs (dim/ant) signal eigenmodes to total eigenmodes ratio
γa (dim/ant) AN eigenmodes to total eigenmodes ratio
ζs (dim/ant) signal eigenmodes to Rx antenna ratio
for varying the number of eigenmodes allocated to either signal or AN; rather, they
simply assume that all eigenmodes available to transmitter and all outside interferers
are utilized. To see this, notice that the equations for C1, C2, η1, and η2 are not
functions of eigenmodes, but rather simply of antenna ratios. If we were to implement
these lemmas directly, we could vary eigenmode allocation over all possible pairs
(ds, da) ∈ D without changing the resulting output.
We will maintain the β notation, as in Lemmas 1 and 2, to denote the asymptotic
ratio of Tx to Rx (or Tx to Ex, for the eavesdropper channel) antennas. To allow










which represent the asymptotic fraction of total eigenmodes devoted to signal and
AN, respectively. For easy reference, the variables defined in the following analyses
are summarized in Table 1.
Proposition 1. In a MIMO wireless channel with t transmit and e eavesdrop anten-
nas, assume the transmitter chooses to transmit ds information symbols and da ≥ e
AN symbols. Define the ratio of signal power to total power as α = Ps
Ps+Pa
. Let
t, e→∞, with t/e→ β, ds/t→ γs, and da/t→ γa. Then the worst-case (eavesdrop-
per SNR → ∞) per-antenna eavesdropper rate can be approximated in closed-form2
2Writing the closed-form solution to the eavesdropper-channel efficiencies η1 and η2 is possible
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as:

























+ (η1 − η2)log2(e), (54)
where η1 and η2 are the solutions on interval [0, 1] to the following:












(1− α)Pη2 + γsγaβ
]
= 1 (56)
Proof. We begin with the expression for eavesdropper rate RE in (35). For a given set



















Finding the eavesdropper rate involves taking the expectation over the random chan-
nel gains between Tx and Ex. However, using results from random matrix theory and
Lemma 1, this quantity can instead be computed for high SNR through expectation
over eigenmode power allocation, which is controllable at the Tx.
To recast the eavesdropper rate from the AN setup into a multiuser interference
framework, we make two key assumptions:
1. The message symbols are sent by the Tx through use of ds antennas, while the
AN symbols can be thought of as coming from a separate, unknown outside
transmitter with da antennas.
2. The power allocated to message symbols is uniformly distributed over the ds
eigenmodes.
using the quadratic and cubic (Cardano) equations. However, doing so gives lengthy and cumbersome
results that do not yield additional insight. Therefore in this chapter we refer to the eavesdropper
results as closed form while leaving them as solutions to 2nd and 3rd-order polynomials.
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Alice first designs the signal and AN covariance matrices Rs and Ra, which are then
spread over the entirety of her t antennas with the right singular vectors of the main





instead apply the singular vectors to the channel matrix G such that Gs = GVs and
Ga = GVa. Note that, because Vs and Va are unitary matrices, G ≡ [GsGa] in

















To maximize the rate over the main channel, Alice would use the standard wa-
terfilling procedure over ds eigenmodes to design Rs. However, for the eavesdropper
channel we assume the worst-case scenario where Eve is able to boost her SNR by
moving closer to the Tx. It is well known that as SNR grows large, the waterfilling
solution converges to the uniform distribution. Thus, our second assumption above
is valid for approximating RE as SNR grows large. The assumption of a uniform
distribution also enables finding a closed-form solution, since the polynomial order of
(55) and (56) increases by one for each additional unique power level allocated.
With α = Ps
P
as the proportion of power allocated to signal transmission, the
proportion of AN power is then (1−α) = Pa
P
. For convenience we assume the receiver























































































which is now in the form of R1 − R2 similar to (45) and (46) for high SNR. Each
term can subsequently be solved using Lemma 2, instead of taking expectation over
random channel gains, but rather by expectation over eigenvalues of matrices Φ1 and





, with probability γs
1−α
γa




, with probability 1. (66)
This transformation is notable, since, as demonstrated in [21], previous attempts
at calculating the ergodic capacity over a subset of eigenmodes require integration
of a continuous eigenvalue distribution (as detailed in the following Partial PDF
Integration subsection), as well as numerical calculation of the lower limit. In contrast,
these new eigenvalue distributions are in fact probability mass functions, and each
expectation in (64) can now be directly evaluated with a summation. The eigenmodes
can then be partitioned to signal and AN, respectively, as γaβ and γsβ, and combining
(48), (50) and taking expectation over (65), the first term in (64) yields














































































R1 −R2, we arrive at the proof.
Although we assume an i.i.d. Gaussian channel model here for comparison with
previous literature, the derivation in Appendix 3.3.2 only requires i.i.d. channel en-
tries. Note that the expectation over complex channel gains H and G has been
replaced in the asymptotic analysis with the solution to a pair of polynomials in η1
and η2. These polynomials are also decoupled, which further reduces the complexity
required to solve the system.
Thus for a given pair (ds, da) ∈ D, the worst-case reduction in secrecy capacity
arising from an eavesdropper of unknown location can be estimated simply by solving
for η1 and η2 and plugging the values into (54). This amounts to finding the zeros
of a set of decoupled quadratic and cubic equations. Note that the secrecy capacity
equation given in (34) is, in general, non-convex, and efficient optimization methods
remain an open problem. The reduction in complexity afforded by the multiuser
interference approximation method will be further scaled by the number of search
points employed by the specific optimization method chosen, for which we introduce
the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. The set of eigenmode allocation pairs (ds, da) ∈ D over which to





where dxe is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
Proof. The values η1 and η2 can be interpreted as multiuser efficiencies [88] , and, to
maximize the secrecy rate, the efficiencies for the Ex channel should equal zero. The





































If Alice is, perhaps sub-optimally, constricted to exhaust all available eigenmodes
on either signal or AN such that ds+da = t, then η1 = 0 for t ≥ e. Without t ≥ e the
AN approach to secrecy is not possible, so in this restrictive case no new information
is gained. However, in such a case the search space would already be greatly reduced.



















which yields the requirement that da ≥ e. This requirement was presented originally
in [21] as a condition to ensure a nonzero determinant in the denominator of the
minimum guaranteed secrecy capacity equation (34). The analysis here confirms the
earlier result from a multiuser interference approach.
Figure 7 shows an example of how eigenmode allocation and power affect Ex
efficiencies η1 and η2. As expected, both efficiencies are shown to decay more quickly
with each additional eigenmode allocated to AN. For the case of β = 3 shown, both η1
and η2 approach zero for sufficient transmit power, thereby limiting the advantage any
eavesdropper is able to gain by moving physically closer to the Tx. Figure 8 shows that
the reduced search space achieved by imposing the additional eigenmode restriction
from Proposition 2 has eliminated the eigenmode pairs smallest in numbers. It is quite
intuitive that Alice would not benefit from using only a small fraction of available
eigenmodes; this fact is now confirmed from the multiuser-interference perspective.
3.3.3 Main Channel: Partial-PDF Integration (PPI)
Closed-form solutions for the ergodic capacity in a strictly AWGN-limited channel
has been studied extensively, and appears in various forms in [85, 67, 86]. However,
all previous closed-form solutions require all available eigenmodes are allocated signal
power. Therefore, a new strategy must be devised when only some eigenmodes are
used. In [21], the eigenvalue PDF is integrated from a lower limit found numerically
instead of the minimum eigenvalue.
To review this process, assume an r× t zero-mean i.i.d. channel H, with r, t→∞
and r/t → ρ = 1/β, the PDF of the eigenvalues of the Wishart channel covariance
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Figure 7: Example eavesdropper efficiencies η1 and η2 as a function of transmit power
P .
matrix HH† converges almost surely [85] as
f(λ) = δ(λ)(1− ρ)+ +
√
(λ− a (ρ))+ (b (ρ)− λ)+
2πλ
, (77)











respectively, and where δ(x) is the Dirac-delta function. For AN systems, ρ < 1, and
(1− ρ) of the probability occurs at λ = 0. However, we are concerned only with the
non-zero eigenvalues for message transmission, and thus we can isolate and normalize
the PDF as
f(λ > 0) =
√
(λ− a (ρ))+ (b (ρ)− λ)+
2πρλ
. (78)
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Figure 8: Example reduction in search space from D (gray) to D (lines) as a result
of adding the restriction in Proposition 2.










) √(λ− a (ρ))+ (b (ρ)− λ)+
2πρλ
dλ. (80)
Substituting the power allocation for the main channel, and scaling by ρ to fulfill the













) √(λ− a (ρ))+ (b (ρ)− λ)+
2πρλ
dλ. (82)
Since r → ∞, the ds largest eigenvalues can be selected by changing the lower limit
of the integral to a value λ∗ which, integrated over the PDF alone yields a value of
ds/r. In [21], the same result is achieved by scaling the PDF by constant ν such that∫∞
λ∗
νf(λ)dλ = 1. Although we have explicit formulas for the minimum and maximum
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eigenvalue, no such expressions for a general partitioning to ds/r exist and the values
of λ∗ must be calculated numerically.
Nonetheless, we compare this approach in both to the new large-scale approxima-
tion we present in closed form in the following section. We find that, though both
asymptotic techniques yield similar results for the small-scale MIMO systems we
study, the large-scale closed-form solution approximation outperforms the numerical
PPI approach in both accuracy and complexity for the cases tested.
3.3.4 Main Channel: Large-Scale Approximation (LSA)
Once again we see that this solution is not directly applicable to the AN problem
since it is a function of the antenna ratio only, and not of eigenmodes. We will retain






as the asymptotic ratio of Rx antennas to signal eigenmodes.
Proposition 3. In a MIMO system with t transmit and r receive antennas, with
t > r, define the number of eigenmodes allocated to signal transmission ds ≤ r. Let
t, r → ∞, t/r → β, ds/t → γs, and r/ds → ζs. Define α = Ps/P as the ratio of
























Proof. The closed form capacity given in Lemma 3 is a function only of β and SNR.
As seen in the preceding discussion of PPI, it is not possible to write one expression
for any arbitrary ordered eigenvalue of a Wishart matrix; rather it must be calculated
numerically. To make the problem of a closed-form solution accounting for a variable
number of eigenmodes tractable, we make the simplifying assumption that the receiver
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will only use as many reception antennas as are set as ds at the Tx. The effect is that
































Finally, noting that MIMO capacities are well known to grow linearly with min(t, r) at
high SNR, we can properly scale the 1/ds rate to the desired 1/r rate by multiplying
by 1/ζs to arrive at RB.
The approximation of the main channel capacity is given in closed form. Intu-
itively, this approximation can be thought of as a scaling of the asymptotic antenna
ratio β by r/ds to reflect the reduction in signal dimensions, and subsequent scaling
of the asymptotic capacity by ds/r to transform the units of the result from bps/Hz
per signal dimension to bps/Hz per receive antenna. Though this analysis is heuristic,
we will see that the performance is nonetheless good for the cases tested.
Proposition 4. Define the approximation error incurred by using the large-scale
















Proof. Since the asymptotic formulas presented rely on antenna ratios rather than
absolute numbers, and since both t/r > 1 and t/ds > 1, the transformation in (84) of
antenna ratio from t/r to t/ds is equivalent to forming the product
(r/ds)t
r
. This can be
interpreted as holding r constant while increasing t (since r/ds ≥ 1). In a MIMO sys-
tem limited purely by AWGN, the per-receive antenna effect of adding extra antennas
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at the Tx was shown in [47] to be strictly limited as C(SNR, β = ∞) − C(SNR, β =
1) = log2(e). Thus, given P sufficient to waterfill over all available eigenmodes,
the per-receive antenna approximation error magnitude is upper-bounded by log2(e)
scaled by 1/ζs as in (84).
As evidenced by Propositions 3 and 4, we witness an interesting interplay between
the error upper bound and the actual error observed. On the one hand, using fewer
available eigenmodes increases the value of ζs, which in turn decreases the maximum
possible error magnitude. On the other hand, using more available eigenmodes brings
ds closer in value to r, which decreases the modeling error. Note that, when all
available signal dimensions are utilized by setting ds = r, the original closed-form
asymptotic capacity solution is regained. Therefore we expect the largest error for
largest |r − ds|, and smallest error both as ds → r and ds → 0.
3.3.5 Computing the MIMOME Secrecy Capacity
To compute the AN generated secrecy capacity for the general MIMOME case, we
combine the results of Propositions 1-3. With the approximations for each channel
and new set D′ of antenna pairs, the secrecy capacity Ĉsec of the MIMOME system






[rRB − eRE], (89)
The simplicity of this approximation is evident upon comparing with (31). Expecta-
tion over random channel gains has been eliminated and replaced with closed-form
expressions, and the optimization method of choice can be implemented over a smaller
search space. Even if the result is non-convex, the results can be used to intelligently
select initial conditions to efficiently search the space with gradient descent methods.
However, because of the great reduction in computation, exhaustive search becomes
a quite reasonable approach.
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While most capacity calculations are done offline during the system design phase,
it is still advantageous to have easy-to-compute expressions for capacity for several
reasons. First, with the proposed expressions, an eavesdropper will be able to quickly
bound the secrecy rate of the main channel. If the channel is evolving in time,
using our proposed expression will greatly reduce the complexity required to make
the approximations. But a more compelling case is that these expressions simply
make it easier for secrecy researcher to compare the rates achievable with a suggested
implementation to the best case rates.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 MIMOME Secrecy Capacity Approximation
To test the accuracy of the approximated secrecy capacity, we compared our results
with 104 Monte Carlo trials. Figure 9 shows an example of the overall asymptotic se-
crecy capacity approximation given in (89) for various antenna configurations plotted
against the actual ergodic secrecy capacity. Although the approximation combines
two large-scale approaches, it nonetheless performs with accurate results for realistic
numbers of antennas. For t = 8, we tested cases of equal numbers of antennas at
Ex and Rx, along with cases where r > e and e > r. Performance is good for all
configurations, with the exception of the case of e = 3 and r = 5 for SNR < 5 dB,
where the secrecy capacity is overestimated; however, for such low power and rates,
AN is unlikely to be an efficient choice of secrecy methods. Note that, for SNRs of
interest, the relative error for the case where e > r is smaller than the r > e case;
this is due to the decrease in approximation error with decrease in allocated signal
dimensions. To further investigate the performance of the overall approximation, we
now look at the individual approximation performance for each channel.
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Figure 9: Performance comparison of the large-scale AN secrecy capacity approxima-
tion R̂sec to actual secrecy capacity Rsec for antenna configurations with realizable
numbers.
3.4.2 Eavesdropper Channel Approximation
To investigate the accuracy of the Ex channel approximation, we ran 104 Monte-Carlo
simulations for various antenna configurations. The minimum guaranteed secrecy ca-
pacity is simulated by letting receiver noise at the Ex go to zero, r equivalently by
letting the SNR at Ex grow very large. Figure 10 shows the multiuser-interference
based approximation for various AN dimensions as a function of SNR. The approx-
imation is shown to be accurate across all values of da for high SNR. Since the Ex
location is unknown in general, the worst case is assumed to maintain secrecy, and
it is only necessary for the approximation to show accuracy in the high-SNR range.
Matching results in [21], we see that Eve’s ability to mitigate the effects of AN by
moving physically closer to the Tx is limited; that is, the Ex capacity grows with
SNR for the low SNR but then plateaus at moderate to high SNR.
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Figure 10: Eavesdropper simulated ergodic capacity (MCS) and large-scale multiuser-
interference approximation (MUIA) with respect to power proportion α for the case
of high SNR and β = 2.
In Figure 11 is shown comparison for the low β case plotted versus percentage of
power α. The accuracy of the multiuser-interference approximation approach appears
largely insensitive to α except at the highest α values, where a slight overestimation
occurs. The approximation is tight in the lower ranges of α when signal dimensions
are limited. The message symbols are assumed to be unencrypted other than via AN
degradation, thus the highest α levels are unlikely to be selected during the maxi-
mization over power allocation in (31), and the approximation yields good results for
values of interest. Finally, note that approximation error present is an overestima-
tion of true value; since the Ex capacity term is subtracted from the main channel
capacity to compute secrecy capacity, any error in the Ex capacity term should be
overestimation in order to preserve overall security.
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Figure 11: Eavesdropper simulated ergodic capacity (MCS) and large-scale multiuser-
interference approximation (MUIA) with respect to power proportion α for the case
of moderate SNR and β = 2.
3.4.3 Main Channel Approximation
For the large-scale MIMO main channel approximation, we again ran 104 Monte-Carlo
trials for comparison with our novel large-scale MIMO approximation, as well as the
partial PDF integration method. In Figure 12 we show the case of t = 10, r = 5, e = 5
and SNR = 35dB. Approximation error for the main channel is greater than the
multiuser-interference approximation. Note that when ds = r, the approximation
matches results from Monte-Carlo simulation.
The performance of the main-channel asymptotic approximation is very good for
any β ≥ 2. The increase in error for β < 2 is exemplified in Figures 13 and 17, which
show the case of t = 15 with β = 1.5 (or r = 10). Both asymptotic approximation
curves are displaced even for the case where ds = r. For β values approaching 1, the
SNR required for almost sure convergence to the large-scale asymptotic model grows
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Figure 12: Main channel: ergodic simulation (MCS) compared with large-scale
asymptotic approximation (LSA), and partial PDF integration (PPI) for β = 2.
large[85] and a different formulation is needed; for higher β values, the approximation
is good for easily attainable SNR levels. If we decrease the number of receive antennas
such that β ≥ 2, the asymptotic approximations perform much better, as seen in
Figures 14 and 15. Even when the number of antennas at Rx and Ex is as small as 3,
the large-scale MIMO approximation is tight for β = 5. The accuracy appears also
to be insensitive to power allocation α.
For β ≥ 2 and sufficient SNR, performance of both approximation methods is
very good. When ds = r and all signal dimensions are utilized, we observe that both
approximation methods yield results identical to Monte-Carlo simulation. Despite
the fact that both approximation methods model large antenna configurations, we
see both perform well for realistic antenna numbers. Remarkably, the closed-form
heuristic solution outperforms the numerical integration technique for the tested cases,
and the difference is more apparent as number of signal dimensions decreases. This
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Figure 13: Main channel: ergodic simulation (MCS) compared with large-scale
asymptotic approximation (LSA), and partial PDF integration (PPI) for β = 1.5.
effect is due to the decreasing bounded error as ds → 0.
Figures 16 and 17 show the percentage error as a function of SNR. Error values
for successively lower signal dimensions show successively higher error percentages,
as expected since the approximation is made by reducing the number of eigenmodes
used.However, at high (very high) SNR the error is less than around 10% (5%) of the
total, and the resulting dramatic decrease in complexity from the closed-form expres-
sion may justify their use. Note that for all ds, SNR, and α values of interest, the
approximations underestimate the main channel capacity. Analogously with overes-
timation in eavesdropper approximation, underestimation error in the main channel
is critical to maintaining security.
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Figure 14: Main channel: ergodic simulation (MCS) compared with large-scale
asymptotic approximation (LSA), and partial PDF integration (PPI) for β = 5.
3.4.4 Complexity Reduction
One primary objective is to provide a low-complexity implementation of secrecy ca-
pacity. In the past, floating-point operations (FLOPS) were used as a metric for
measuring the computational complexity of an algorithm. With the advent of par-
allel processing and multi-core processors, FLOPS are no longer a viable measure of
complexity, since algorithms that are highly parallelized can sometimes be computed
more quickly than those that are not, even with higher FLOP counts. In fact, Math-
Works has removed the functions for FLOPS-counting from its standard MATLAB
package, and replaced it in documentation with suggestions for simple execution time
calculations [57].
Nonetheless, it is important to note in certain cases how FLOPS might (or might
not) scale with increases in antennas. As an example comparison, consider the well
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 15: Main channel: ergodic simulation (MCS) compared with large-scale
asymptotic approximation (LSA), and partial PDF integration (PPI) for β = 2.
known log-det formula for simulating main-channel capacity (i.e. the first term in
(34)). Depending on the algorithm used, the number of FLOPS required to compute
a matrix determinant for a p × p matrix can range from approximately O(p2) on
upwards to O(p4). The large-scale MIMO closed-form approximation given here has
equivalent complexity (in order of magnitude) regardless of matrix size.
As an example, we ran two sets of Monte-Carlo trials on a computer equipped
with a 32-bit dual-core Intel processor. The results of these experiments are shown
in Tables 2 and 3 for the eavesdropper and main channels, respectively. For the
eavesdropper channel, we have used the MATLAB function ‘fzero’ to solve (55) for
η1 and (56) for η2 at each iteration. With this method, the multiuser approximation
showed a reduction of two orders of magnitude.
As expected with a closed-form solution, the reduction in computation time for
the main channel was even more dramatic, at six orders of magnitude less than the
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Figure 16: Main channel: percentage error in large-scale asymptotic approximation
(LSA), and partial PDF integration (PPI) for the case of β = 5.
104 Monte-Carlo trials. Thus, while the main channel approximation may produce
modest amounts of error, the enormous reduction in computation time may make
its use worthwhile, and enable its use in resource-constrained wireless systems. The
computation time required for the PPI approximation is also shown; the large-scale
approximation we present here is consistently favorable three by orders of magnitude
in this comparison as well.
Table 2: Eavesdropper channel computation times for Monte-Carlo simulation (MCS)
trials, and multiuser interference approximation (MUIA).
t e MCS (s) MUIA (s)
10 3 4.7× 102 7.1
10 8 1.0× 103 15.7
15 3 6.0× 102 9.6
15 10 1.7× 103 18.1
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 17: Main channel: percentage error in large-scale asymptotic approximation
(LSA), and partial PDF integration (PPI) for the case of β = 1.5.
3.5 Discussion
While an exact closed-form solution to the AN generated secrecy capacity is an in-
tractable problem for the MIMOME channel, we have demonstrated that asymptotic
approximations can be used effectively in place of ergodic Monte-Carlo simulation to
accurately estimate the secrecy capacity in an AN system with Tx-Rx antenna ratio
over a wide range of SNR. In doing so, the computational complexity involved can
Table 3: Main channel computation times for Monte-Carlo simulation (MCS) trials,
Large-Scale Approximation (LSA), and Partial PDF Integration (PPI).
t r MCS (s) LSA (s) PPI (s)
10 3 1.8× 103 4.7× 10−4 4.3× 10−1
10 8 1.8× 103 3.2× 10−4 2.6× 10−1
15 3 4.2× 103 7.6× 10−4 5.3× 10−1
15 10 6.5× 103 7.6× 10−4 5.2× 10−1
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be enormously reduced, potentially by many orders of magnitudes. This complex-
ity reduction would allow for comparison of the specific implementation with secrecy
capacity in complexity constrained or adaptive systems with some expected channel
evolution. The approximation methods presented here maintain secrecy by providing
a lower bound on available secrecy rates for SNRs of interest. The eavesdropper-
channel rate approximation method is seen to perform with near exactness with the
worst-case assumption of infinite SNR, while the main-channel approximation error
magnitude was shown to be bounded. Finally, though simulated here for the i.i.d.
Gaussian channel model, the techniques we present require no such assumption and
are generalizable to any MIMOME channel with i.i.d. entries of arbitrary distribution.
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Chapter IV
JOINT RADAR-COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN
DOUBLY SELECTIVE CHANNELS
In Chapters 2 and 3, we presented tools useful in interference design. In this chap-
ter, we consider interference in the design process. As the prevalence of wireless
technologies continues to grow, the spectrum becomes increasingly crowded. Hence,
interference between systems operating in the same frequency band and at the same
time is also an increasingly important issue. This chapter investigates the perfor-
mance of a cooperative, jointly-designed communication-radar system. At the core of
this investigation is the notion that, despite major differences in overall mission, the
processes involved in radar detection mirror those of channel estimation in a com-
munication system in many ways. By cooperating, the redundant processing can be
shared and interference reduced.
If both systems operate independently, in overlapping frequency bands, and with-
out regard to the other, interference is unavoidable. The most straightforward solution
to eliminate interference is to divide the resources available into separate regions of
time or frequency through policy, such as the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) spectral allocation or dynamic spectrum access [20, 104]. In an environment
where it is desired to operate both radar and communication systems, this amounts
to either the systems taking turns using the whole frequency band or allocating two
non-overlapping portions of the band for simultaneous operation. Here, we explore
the possibility of dividing neither time nor frequency; our system allows both systems
to share the entire available spectrum at all times.
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4.1 Introduction
In a frequency-selective channel, the transmitted signal is spread in time, causing
inter-symbol interference which must be corrected for at the receiver. If the receiver
does not know the channel a priori, it is common to devote a portion of the transmit-
ted signal to training (i.e. pilot) symbols. PSAM is a popular choice for pilot symbols,
and is able to capture time-domain channel variations by spreading the pilot symbols
throughout a transmission block [9, 13]. Radar uses repeated pulses like those in
PSAM to identify Doppler shifts induced by moving targets [68]. While the goals
of radar and communication are inherently different, both require characterization of
the multipath channel; that is, both systems require a channel estimate. Radar sys-
tems use the channel estimate to detect and locate targets, whereas communications
systems use the estimate to account for the effects of fading. This forms the basis for
our joint radar-communication system, where a single channel estimation process is
shared between the two systems.
We assume the multipath environment is doubly-selective, i.e., the channel varies
over both frequency and time. Further, we design our transmit signal so that the re-
ceived signal can be easily decomposed into data-only and training-only signals. This
decouples the channel and data estimation processes. In the decoupled system, we
allocate a portion of power to estimate the channel and use the remainder to transmit
data. For a block transmission scheme with decoupled linear estimation, equipowered
and equispaced training symbols have been shown to be both the minimum mean-
square error (MMSE) and maximum-capacity (lower bound) strategy [49]. We begin
with this equipowered and equispaced single-pulse strategy, which has been shown to
be optimal for communication. Because radar detection requires more energy than
channel estimation for communication, this optimal scheme may not be feasible to
implement using actual radar amplifiers. To explore more practical solutions, we
consider suboptimal training schemes with energy spread over multiple consecutive
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pulses. In particular, we compare the capacity lower bound from optimal training
with those achieved using Barker sequences.
The combination and/or cooperation of radar and communication is not a new
topic. Previous studies have primarily addressed either waveform design or radar-
communication coexistence issues (i.e. interference mitigation). The joint operation
we study in this chapter requires full cooperation between the radar and communi-
cation in both waveform design and hardware. The problem setup is illustrated in
Figure 18. To highlight the contributions of our work, we enumerate the following
features of our chosen configuration:
• One single-antenna transmitter shared by radar and communication systems,
• One transmitted signal vector consisting of both data and pilot symbols,
• Narrowband transmission,
• One single-antenna, shared receiver ,
• One received signal vector, which is distributed to each system after reception
for independent processing,
• Elimination of interference in the time domain,
• One (at least) mobile terminal.
Since we design our one transmitted signal for both systems, both systems share the
full spectrum at all times. In contrast to previous works that propose dividing the
available spectrum between systems (e.g. [36, 83, 91]), our joint design capitalizes on
redundancy between channel estimation and radar detection by allowing both systems
to use the same training signal. Our single antenna transmission design is desirable in
that it is low complexity, helps keep hardware costs low, and is more applicable to the
predominant existing hardware; however, it preempts use of MIMO techniques such
64
as the orthogonal waveform interference mitigation in [16], or multiple-access channel
models as in [5]. We also show that a narrowband approach is effective, in contrast
to wideband or ultra-wideband techniques in [16, 83, 70]. With the time-selective
channel model we use, OFDM techniques such as those used in [17, 81, 77, 46] are
likely to experience interference from spectral leakage, and system performance may
suffer. We employ a basis-expansion model to capture the variations of the channel
in both time and frequency domains. In [17], Barker sequences for pulse-compression
(other sequence choices for pulse-compression and their effects are considered in [80]);
in contrast, here we use Barker sequences for their autocorrelation and sidelobe prop-
erties and to reduce peak-to-average power ratio (PAPR), and our implementation
has no spreading effect on the transmit spectrum.
Finally, the majority of previous studies assume monostatic radar that uses a
portion of its transmit signal (or bandwidth) to communicate to a separate receiver
that is uninterested in the radar signal. In contrast, we assume the bistatic case where
the receiver is both interested in the data sent by the transmitter and detecting targets
in the multipath environment. Rather than dividing time or spectrum between the
two systems, we keep the bandwidth and structure of the waveform constant while
dividing the total power between data and pilot symbols. The bistatic radar model
we use significantly complicates Doppler calculations. For a comprehensive treatment
of bistatic clutter and bistatic Doppler derivations, respectively, see [94, Ch. 11] and
[93, Ch. 5].
Notation: Bold-face capital (lower-case) letters denote matrix (vector) values, and
plain text denotes scalar values. Superscript H(T) denotes the Hermitian (regular)
transpose, and superscript ∗ is used for conjugation. b·c is the integer floor. E[·]
denotes expectation. The trace of a matrix is denoted tr[·]. We use ‖ · ‖ to denote the
Euclidean norm of a vector, and ⊗ to denote the Kronecker product. We use diag[x]
to denote a square matrix with vector x as its diagonal elements and zeros elsewhere.
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Figure 18: Problem setup. The joint system uses a single antenna at both the mobile
transmitter and stationary receiver, and designs a single waveform to be used by both
the wireless communication and bistatic radar systems.
4.2 System Model
4.2.1 Doubly-Selective Channel Model
The impulse response of a doubly-selective channel varies with time parameter t and
delay parameter τ . Let the time and delay-varying channel impulse response be
h(t; τ). The scattering function





describes the average output power of the channel for Doppler frequency f and delay
τ , where
Ah(∆t; τ) , E [h
∗(t; τ)h(t+ ∆t; τ)] (91)
is the 2-D autocorrelation function with respect to time shift ∆t. The average and
root-mean-square delay spreads are found using the standard definitions in [24, Ch. 3].
We assume |Sh(f ; τ)| ≈ 0 for |τ | > τmax and ∀ f , and |Sh(f ; τ)| ≈ 0 for |f | > fmax and
∀ τ . For a given channel, the values of τmax and fmax are easily measured empirically,
and thus assumed to be known. We assume the channel remains constant for some
duration NTs, where Ts is the sampling period at the receiver and N is a positive
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integer. This model invites block-based processing, where a contiguous block of N
transmitted symbols is processed concurrently.
We use a Fourier basis expansion model (BEM) to capture the multipath delay
and Doppler characteristics of the channel. With knowledge of fmax and τmax, the
channel can be represented with L + 1 delay samples and Q + 1 Doppler samples
where L = bτmax/Tsc and Q = dfmax/∆fe, 1/∆f = NTs, and where ∆f is the
Doppler sample spacing. Therefore all multipath reflections arrive within L delay
samples after the pulse, with a Doppler-sample between −Q/2 and Q/2. Let i denote
the received sample index, and define the block index k = bi/Nc. Using the BEM,












is the qth frequency component.
We also assume that h(i; l) = c(i; l) + s(i; l) is the summation of clutter, c(i; l),











where cq(k; l) and sq(k; l) are the Fourier coefficients of the k
th block for the clut-
ter and target, respectively. Each cq(k; l) is an independent, but not identically
distributed, zero-mean circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with
variance σ2cq(k,l). We assume the target is a Swerling I point target [68] independent
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of all clutter. Let l0 and q0, respectively, denote the delay bin and Doppler basis of
the target. Then the sum in (95) simplifies to
s(i; l) = α(k)δ(l − l0)ejωq0 i, (96)
where α(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2α) is the effective complex target gain that incorporates the
target radar cross section (RCS).
4.2.2 Block Transmission Model
As stated in Section 4.2.1, the channel model invites block-based processing. Define
uk as the kth transmitted block vector. Our transmission scheme is the same as [49],
which breaks uk intoM subblocks. The first and last L symbols in the training portion
of each subblock are set to zero (i.e. zero-padded), which prevents the returns from the
information and training portion of the subblocks from interfering with each other.
Further, this ensures there is no interference between blocks or between subblocks
within a block. While it is also possible to decouple equally effectively by using a
cyclic prefix, zero-padding is more power efficient since all transmitted cyclic prefix
symbols are discarded at the receiver. This training strategy, therefore, effectively
decouples channel estimation from symbol decoding.
The motivation for designing decoupled signaling is to reduce decoding complexity
at the receiver. In general, estimating the channel and transmitted data is a nonlinear
estimation problem (see e.g. [87, 82]). By padding the space between information
symbols and the training symbols with L zeros, the problem splits into two separate
linear estimation problems by simply selecting the appropriate samples at the receiver.
Since our assumed design eliminates inter-block interference (IBI), and since we
will process each received block in an identical manner, we hereafter focus on one
block and omit the block index k. Therefore, we may write the transmit sequence as













where dm is the m
th data subblock and bm is the m
th training subblock. With this




h(i; l)u(i− l) + w(i), (98)
where w(i) is zero-mean circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian with variance σ2w. In
matrix-vector form, the received block is
y = Hu + w, (99)
where y = [y(1) . . . y(N)]T and w = [w(1) . . . w(N)]T. Defining
Dq = diag[1 e
jωq . . . ejωq(N−1)], (100)





Each Hq is a lower-triangular N ×N Toeplitz matrix with first column
[hq(0) . . . hq(L) 01×(N−L)]
T and first row [hq(0) 01×(N−1)]. Note that for any q,
the Fourier coefficients are functions only of delay τ , and the time-selectivity of the
channel is described in the frequency domain.
Define the block data symbol vector d , [dT1 d
T
2 . . . d
T
M ] and the block training
vector b , [bT1 b
T
2 . . . b
T
M ]
T, and let N̄dm and N̄
b
m denote the length of the mth
data and training subblocks, respectively. The total number of data and training








m, respectively. The symbols
arriving at the receiver only as a result of training symbols (i.e., the portion of the
received signal containing no multipath delay from data symbol transmission) are
yb = Hbb + wb, which are easily extracted from y by simply selecting the rows with
indices corresponding to integers on the interval [rb1, r
b
2], where




















m contains the noise samples for the training portion of the m
th
subblock, and Hbq,m and D
b
q,m are the submatrices of Hq and Dq due to the training
portion of the mth subblock, respectively. Expanding the pilot-only signal across both



























where the last equality of (105) follows from the commutativity of convolution (Hbq,mbm =
Bmhq). By expanding the sum over Q, we can write the received training signal in
vector matrix form as
yb , Φbh + wb, (106)
where Φb is a known block matrix with [Φb]m,q = Dq,mBm, hq , [hq(0) . . . hq(L)]T,
and h = [hT0 h
T





Define the total power transmitted as
P , E[‖u‖2], (107)
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Figure 19: Subblock structure of an example transmit waveform using optimal train-
ing (top) and the resulting noise-free channel output (bottom), for channel length 5
and data subblock length 10. Red circles show the single training symbol per sub-
block. Blue dots and green x’s show the real and imaginary parts of the data symbols
using QPSK modulation. Vertical arrows match the end of the zero padding regions
(top) with corresponding spots where received channel energy returns to zero. Hor-
izontal arrows indicate the partitioning of the received (noise-free) signal into data
and training.
which is split between power allocated to data symbols (Pd , E[‖d‖2]) and training
symbols (Pb , ‖b‖2). To quantify the effect of sharing power between systems, we
define the power allocation parameter ρ such that Pd , ρP and Pb , (1 − ρ)P .
Denote the average power per data and training symbol, respectively, as P̄d = Pd/Nd
and P̄b = Pb/Nb. Further, define Hd as the portion of the channel matrix affecting
only data symbols and yd = Hdd + wd as the resulting received signal; these can be
formed by selecting from H, y and w the rows with indices corresponding to integers
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on the interval [rd1, r
d
2], where
rd1 = (m− 1)(N̄dm + N̄ bm) + 1 (108)
rd2 = (m− 1)(N̄dm + N̄ bm) + N̄dm + L, (109)
for each m ∈ [1,M ] and column indices on the intervals [cd1, cd2], where
cd1 = (m− 1)(N̄dm + N̄ bm) + 1 (110)
cd2 = (m− 1)(N̄dm + N̄ bm) + N̄dm, (111)
for each m ∈ [1,M ].
4.3.1 Radio Optimization
4.3.1.1 LMMSE Channel Estimation
For a given channel realization, the channel capacity is a function of the transmitted

















where expectation is over random channel gains Hd (i.e. the parts of H contributing
to Hd). The overbar notation signifies that C represents an upper bound on capacity
since Hd is unknown and must be estimated. Since no channel information is as-
sumed known at the transmitter, (112) implicitly assumes uniform power allocation
(i.e. E[ddH] = P̄dI). This upper bound provides a benchmark for performance with











where Rh = E[hh










If Rh is diagonal, the MSE in (114) is minimized by designing the product Φ
H
b Φb to
be diagonal [60, App. I]. This can be seen intuitively by noting that Ψ , ΦHb Φb is
positive definite, and by the Hadamard inequality the diagonal terms [Ψ]i,i are at a
maximum when Ψ is diagonal; thus, the trace of the inverse is minimized under the
same condition.
The formula for the capacity of a channel is a function of its random channel
gains, and does not traditionally account for effects of channel estimation. However,
poor channel estimation will surely result in lower achievable rates. Note that yb is
not a function of the estimation error. To incorporate the effect channel estimation















where Ĥd is the estimate of Hd, Rv , P̄dE[H̃dH̃Hd ] + σ
2
wI, and H̃d , Ĥd − Hd.
The expectation in (115) is again over random channel realizations Hd, but also the
noise wd; the estimates Ĥd, and hence error matrices H̃d, are functions of Hd and
noise wd. At high signal to noise ratio (SNR), the LMMSE estimate that results in
maximal lower bound on ergodic channel capacity is attained [49] if:
C1. all data subblocks have the same number of symbols (i.e. N̄d1 = N̄
d
2 = · · · =
N̄dM , N̄d),
C2. all training subblocks have only one nonzero symbol (i.e. N̄ b1 = N̄
b
2 = · · · =
N̄ bM , N̄b = 2L+1) and are allocated equal power (i.e. ‖bm‖2 = Pb/M for each
m ∈ [1,M ]), and
C3. the number of subblocks equals the number of Doppler bases (i.e. M = Q+ 1).
Given aformentioned C1-3, the identical structure of subblocks can be exploited to
write the error covariance matrix as
E[H̃dH̃
H
d ] = IM ⊗ (E[H̃d,mH̃Hd,m]), (116)
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where H̃d,m is the portion of H̃d found by taking rows and columns defined in (108)-
(109) and (110)-(111), respectively. Noting that the error covariance is diagonal, the


























for k ∈ [0, L − 1], where h̃q(l) = hq(l) − ĥq(l). For optimal training, the transmit
vector resulting from conditions C1-3 is of the form












where b = Pb/M .
4.3.1.2 Least-Squares Channel Estimation
The LMMSE channel estimate assumes that the channel covariance matrix is known.
There are instances, such as a sudden shift in environment, where this assumption
is unwarranted. We can lower bound the achievable communication rates by remov-
ing the known channel statistics and using data-driven least-squares (LS) channel












































where (123) follows from conditions C1-3, and the inequality in (124) follows from the
fact that Rh is a covariance matrix with all diagonal elements greater than or equatl
to zero. There is no direct link between LS estimation error in (122) and LS estimate
(121) and the capacity bound in (115). However, since the lower bound proof in [49,
App. C] relies on an assumption of high SNR, and since at high SNR the LMMSE
and least-squares estimates converge, the effect of the channel estimates on the lower
bound capacity is negligible. Thus, minimizing Rv (by plugging in the errors of LS
estimates) can maximize the lower bound capacity with LS approximation.
4.3.2 Radar Target Detection
We can decompose the pilot portion of the received signal in (106) into its clutter
and target components:
yb = Φbs + Φbc + wb (125)
= Φbs + w̃, (126)
where c = [c(0) . . . c(L)]T, s = [s(0) . . . s(L)]T, and w̃ , Φbc + wb with covariance
Rw̃ = E[(Φbc + wb)(Φbc + wb)
H]. (127)
The detection problem then becomes
H0 : yb = w̃ (128)
H1 : yb = Φbs + w̃, (129)
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where the null hypothesis H0 represents the case where the received signal is clutter
and noise only, and the alternative hypothesis H1 represents the presence of a target
in clutter and noise. The Neyman-Pearson (NP) [39] detector decides H1 if the





The detection performance when s is a known vector is easily found. However,
from (96) it is clear that both the magnitude and the phase of the target return
are unknown quantities. Whether or not the target magnitude |α(k)| is known has
no effect on the structure of the detector; thus |α(k)| can be assumed known when
deriving the detector, and accounted for using noncoherent integration [68, Ch. 6.2].
Knowing the phase ∠α(k) requires knowing the range to the target to incredible pre-
cision, since only a change of a quarter wavelength causes a complete reversal of phase
in the returned signal. To account for this unknown phase, we use envelope detection
assuming the magnitude is a known vector m, and examine detection performance
when s = ejθm, where θ ∼ U(0, 2π). The probability of detection for a Swerling I







where T ′ is a threshold selected to give a desired probability of false alarm PFA
(i.e. T ′ = T ′(PFA)), and χ is the signal to interference (clutter) plus noise ratio
(SINR). Note that (131) is monotonic in χ. Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it




If we assume Rw̃ is diagonal (i.e. each cq(k, l) is independent), optimal training signals
are used, and the target is a point target, then, using the definitions in (94)-(96), the
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Note that (133) is monotonic in Pb. Thus, both the radar performance and the
communications performance are tied to the proportion of transmit power allocated
to channel estimation. The performance of both systems is considered jointly over Pb
in the next section.
Since the two systems fully cooperate, it is theoretically possible to use the entire
transmit waveform for detection after the communication system has finished decod-
ing the data. However, we omit the use of data symbols for detection for the following
reasons. First, this chapter focuses on low-complexity linear approach. Second, the
latency resulting from decoding the data before sending to the radar system would
likely be unsatisfactory in many radar applications. Finally, feedback paths in hard-
ware design are generally frowned upon due to timing and synchronization issues. We
therefore leave detection using the entire waveform for future work.
4.3.3 Optimality Considerations
When finding an optimal solution, it is important to make explicit in what sense a
solution is optimal. At the outset we adopted a training scheme shown to be optimal
for communication systems; however, other training schemes may perform better
for radar purposes because of the higher energy required. In what follows, we will
continue to refer to the training scheme that achieves the LMMSE channel estimate
as “optimal,” while acknowledging that other training schemes may perform better
on other metrics.
4.3.3.1 Suboptimal Training
For radar, probability of detection is a function of the total amount of transmitted
energy reflecting off the target, rather than the peak transmission power. Using
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the repeated single pulse optimal for communication, the peak power required for
detection may greatly exceed the capability of amplifiers standard in radar hardware.
Instead, the optimal signaling structure can be relaxed to allow the total power needed
to detect targets to be distributed over multiple consecutive training symbols.
Barker sequences [25] have two properties that make them a good choice for
spreading power allocated to training over multiple symbols: 1) they are constant
modulus, facilitating amplification, and 2) they exhibit autocorrelation sidelobes with
maximum power inversely proportional to the code length, and therefore provide a
good approximation to a single-pulse train. The Barker sequences we employ here
differ from Barker coding traditionally used in radar for pulse compression in that the
chip duration is equivalent to the symbol duration, so the bandwidth is equivalent for
any Barker (as well as optimal) sequence length. Rather than increasing bandwidth,
sequences of increasing length instead produce longer overall block lengths. This al-
lows fair comparison of differing sequence lengths, since the capacity lower bound is
normalized by block length.
Note that the data symbol subblocks are unaffected by the use of Barker se-
quences, since we apply them only to training. However, using Barker sequences the
lower bound on capacity in (115) is likely to suffer, since a larger percentage of time
is spent on training. This effect is shown in Figure 20. In addition to total time
spent transmitting training symbols, suboptimal training also affects channel esti-
mation error, since Barker sequences have good (but not ideal, like a single optimal
training pulse) autocorrelation properties. Using Barker sequences also affects the
probability of detection. From (133), it is apparent that sequence length has no effect
on probability of detection in the radar system if the clutter plus noise covariance is
uncorrelated, and so long as ΦHΦ is diagonal. Despite their desirable autocorrelation
properties, however, Barker sequences do not produce a strictly diagonal ΦHΦ, so
we must revert to (132) when calculating SINR. We expect that the use of Barker
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Figure 20: Barker-sequence counterpart to Figure 19. Here, a Barker sequence of
length 7 is shown, and all other parameters are held constant. Note the increased
length of the received training signal compared to the single-pulse optimal training
used in Figure 19.
sequences is likely to have a more detrimental effect on the lower bound on capacity
than on probability of detection, since capacity is affected both by time and quality
of estimation, whereas the ΦHΦ will still be nearly diagonal.
4.3.3.2 Sampling Doppler Outside the Clutter Region
For both communication and radar systems, keeping Q to a minimum avoids unnec-
essary overhead. In communication-only systems, the value is often set to
Q = dfmaxNTse (134)
so that the highest Doppler frequency sampled coincides with the maximum clut-
ter Doppler component, and the Doppler samples are evenly spaced on the interval
[−fmax, fmax]. Here, we use the block length N to be the FFT size used in the BEM.
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It has been noted that using a denser FFT and higher Q values can increase the
accuracy of the BEM [71]. However, to estimate Q+ 1 Doppler bases we need Q+ 1
subblocks, so increasing Q results in progressively longer block lengths and processing
complexity. From a radar perspective, choosing a larger Q may also be required to
identify a target producing a Doppler shift that exceeds the maximum Doppler shift
produced by clutter. Say, for example, that we are interested in a target with Doppler
shift (1 + δ)fmax, for any δ > 0. Then if we define Q as in (134), our target Doppler
will alias. We might then be tempted to accept longer block lengths and increase Q
to avoid aliasing, but with the exception of the target Doppler, all Doppler values
outside the clutter region are modeled (in Jakes’ model) as exactly zero. Thus, h
would become be a degenerate Gaussian random vector. While these are interesting
issues to be solved, they lie beyond the scope of this chapter. In Section 4.4 we con-
sider cases where the target is located within the Doppler spread of the clutter; the
study of targets outside of this spread is left for future work.
4.4 Numerical Examples
We simulated the joint system using 60 Monte Carlo trials. We varied the total block-
duration power P in (107) from 20 W to 120 kW, and percentage of power allocated
to data over 0 < ρ < 1. The delay power in our channel was modeled as decaying
exponentially as Ah(0; τ) = β1exp(−τ/β2), with β1 and β2 representing the initial
power and power decay parameters, respectively. For an exponential decay model
with average delay spread µτ and RMS delay spread στ , we have µτ = στ = β2. For
our simulations we chose β1 to be 1/10 of the line of sight power at the receiver, and
β2 = 2 seconds. Figure 21 shows the Doppler power spectrum, normalized such that
the total Doppler power sums to 1, and the power delay profile (PDP), normalized
by the line of sight power.
We used an initial block size of N = 2048, with channel length L = 30 and Doppler
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resolution Q = 16. For our system parameters, we used a carrier frequency of 2 GHz
with a bandwidth of 1 MHz; transmit and receive gains of 5 dB; system losses of
2 dB; and a noise figure of 3 dB. Suboptimal training was implemented by simply
replacing each scalar b in (120) with an appropriately power-scaled Barker sequence
of desired length. For example, if a Barker-4 sequence was used, each b would be
replaced with P̄b
4
[+1,+1,−1,+1]. To keep the block length N relatively constant,
we first set the number of subblocks M = Q + 1 and then selected Nd to yield the
smallest Nd +M(2L+ LB) ≥ N , where LB is the Barker sequence length.
The transmitter and receiver were positioned at (10, 0) km and (0, 0) km, re-
spectively, and the target was positioned at (5, 7) km, as shown in Figure 22. We
assumed a stationary transmitter, and mobile receiver and target with instantaneous
velocity vectors (0,−900) and (0,−800) km/hr, respectively. With these velocities
and positions, the bistatic Doppler shift of the target lies within the total Doppler
spread arising from clutter. This allows us to adopt Jakes’ model [34] for the channel
Doppler spread and find the MMSE channel estimate.
The effect of the power allocation ρ is shown in Figure 23 for the capacity lower
bound. The communication system functions well in the lower total power range.
Note that the power values given represent fundamentally different quantities: the
value given in W or kW is the total power transmitted over the entire block duration;
the value in dB is the SNR per symbol at the receiver. The figure shows three curves:
the light gray curve is the upper bound from (112) assuming the channel is known per-
fectly at the receiver and does not require estimation. The solid blue and dotted red
curves show the effect of imperfect MMSE and LS estimation, respectively. The left
portions of the curves are power limited in that there is negligible difference between
performance with perfect channel knowledge compared to the estimated channel per-
formance, and rate increases are achieved only by allocating more power to the data
signal. The right portions of the curves are estimation limited in that the effect of
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Figure 21: Clutter Doppler power (top) and power delay profile (bottom).


















Figure 22: Simulation scenario.
channel estimation becomes salient. These trends appear largely insensitive to overall
transmit power across the moderate to high receiver SNR cases tested.
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Figure 23: Capacity lower bound as a function of power allocation for various total
transmission powers and corresponding receiver SNR per symbol. MMSE: solid blue;
LS: dotted red; upper bound: solid light-gray.
The radar detection probability shown in Figure 24 is monotonic in total power
allocated to training. For low total power, allocating more power to training greatly
increases detection probability, whereas for high total power the benefit of allocating
more power to training saturates quickly. Note that the overall power expenditures
necessary for the radar system are much higher than those needed for reliable com-
munication. From (131) and (133), it is also clear that detection probability is a
function only of the channel realization and total power Pb allocated to training, and
thus is unaffected by method of channel estimation so long as optimal training se-
quences are transmitted. The detection probabilities for Barker sequences show slight
performance degradation, but do not significantly change the shapes of the curves.
Note that longer Barker sequences actually perform closer to optimal training than
shorter ones, since the autocorrelation sidelobes decrease with sequence length.
The joint communication-radar performance is shown in Figure 25. The curves
83









































Figure 24: Probability of detection as a function of power allocation for various total
transmission powers and corresponding receiver SNR per symbol.
shown are parameterized over 0 < ρ < 1. Values marked by squares (diamonds)
represent the capacity-maximizing values for the MMSE (LS) case. For the MMSE
case, the maximizing values for the two lower-power curves are obtained by setting
ρ = 0.71; for the two higher power curves, the maximizing ρ = 0.61. For LS, all
maximizing values arise from ρ = 0.61. These maximizing values show the diminishing
returns of incorporating prior knowledge of channel statistics. We note that the actual
achievability region is obtained by dropping a vertical line from the point of maximized
capacity lower bound, since anywhere below that point is (unadvisably) achievable
simply by selecting an inferior detection method. When total power grows large,
inflection points begin to appear in the performance curves. These points indicate
the allocation values at which further allocating power away from training becomes
more detrimental to detection probability than to the capacity lower bound.
Figure 27 shows the PAPR for blocks using optimal training versus Barker coded
training signals. For optimal training, PAPR is monotonically decreasing with power
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Figure 25: Joint radar-communication system performance for various total trans-
mission powers and corresponding receiver SNR per symbol. MMSE: solid blue; LS:
dotted red; upper bound: solid light-gray.
allocated to data. Barker sequences reduce PAPR by up to 10 dB. Codes with length
7 or 13 also achieve the lowest PAPR at lower data allocation values.
Figure 26 shows the time-domain discrete baseband transmitted signal for opti-
mal training versus a Barker code of length 13 for 8 kW total transmit power and
ρ = 0.71. Even though the power and chosen allocation level are the same for each
case, the dynamic range of the optimal training signal is far higher than that of the
Barker coded signal, since the optimal training signal concentrates all its power into
a single symbol while the Barker code spreads the power over many training sym-
bols. Spreading training energy over multiple symbols could greatly facilitate the
amplification process in practical systems.
The effect of using Barker sequences as a suboptimal training scheme is shown in
Figures 28 and 29 for the MMSE and LS cases, respectively. In both cases, there is
a penalty paid for increasing the length of the nonzero training signal. The penalty
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Optimal Training, Tx power:8 kW, ρ=0.71



















Barker Code Length: 13, Tx power:8 kW, ρ=0.71
Figure 26: Comparison of training symbol instantaneous power levels using a single
pulse per subblock optimal for communications systems (top) and after spreading
power among multiple training symbols using a Barker sequence (bottom).
at low SNR is negligible and becomes more substantial as overall transmitted power
grows. However, the gaps from the Barker curves to the optimal training curve appear
relatively insensitive to allocation level. This signifies that lower bounds on capacity
for higher code lengths become time limited in that the penalty appears to have little
relation to channel estimation quality.
4.5 Discussion
We have presented an analysis framework for a cooperative radar-communication
system operating simultaneously in the same frequency band. Our design leverages
decoupled training and data to yield low-complexity linear processing for the com-
munication system, and assumes a point-target model, which yields a simple detector
structure for the radar system. The specific performance of each system depends on
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Figure 27: Peak to average power ratio for optimal training and three Barker code
training signals.


































Figure 28: Capacity lower bound using Barker training sequences compared to the
optimal training scheme for MMSE channel estimation.
the power allocation, but mutually successful coexistence is possible. Optimal train-
ing signals are shown to produce the greatest lower bound on communication rate
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Figure 29: Capacity lower bound using Barker training sequences compared to the
optimal training scheme for LS channel estimation.
as well as the maximum probability of detection. Given that amplification is likely
to impose real-world constraints on instantaneous transmitted power, we have shown
that Barker training sequences are a viable option. The penalty for using Barker
sequences is most apparent in the lower bound on achievable communication rate,
and less significant for radar detection. Despite being suboptimal, the longer Barker
sequences have the advantage of greatly reducing PAPR and retaining near-optimal
detection performance. Future work can extend the framework to more more complex
scenarios, specifically addressing coupled data and symbol detection with nonlinear
processing to compare performance gains with increased complexity, expanding be-




SECRET WIRELESS COMMUNICATION USING
DATA-CARRYING ARTIFICIAL NOISE
In Chapter 4, we saw how interference could be eliminated in the co-design of com-
peting systems. In this chapter, we present a new method of securing communication
that combines two previously studied secrecy methods: 1) secret keys, and 2) artificial
noise, as detailed in Chapter 3. The new method exploits the randomness property
of secret keys that makes encrypted codewords appear noise-like to those who do not
posses the key. We leverage this fact to use secret-key encrypted codewords as a form
of designed interference. We demonstrate that this new use of intentional interference
is simultaneously able to increase achievable secrecy rates and reduce power necessary
for a given secrecy rate. We first prove these benefits assuming that there is no cost or
overhead associated with using secret keys. We follow the ideal case by examining the
more realistic scenario where there is a small price paid for using keys as interference,
and give bounds on the achievable rates.
5.1 Introduction
One method of securing wireless communications is symmetric encryption with a se-
cret key at the transmitter (Tx) and decryption with an identical key at the receiver
(Rx). Such systems require pre-distribution of keys, and the security they provide is
good only so long as the keys themselves are not vulnerable to discovery. In 1949,
Claude Shannon published the first framework for the study of secret communica-
tion in an information-theoretic sense by proving that a one-time pad (OTP) could
perfectly secure communication [75]. Though exceedingly simple in implementation,
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Shannon’s OTP is limited in applicability because of the strict requirements 1) that
the key be at least as long as the message, and 2) that the key be generated from a
truly random source. With symmetric keys at both ends of a communication link, the
OTP can be implemented quite simply using a (modulo) adder. With such simplic-
ity and the ability to ensure perfect secrecy, it would seem that problem of securing
communication would be solved completely.
Unfortunately, OTP encryption is laden with requirements that restrict its prac-
tical feasibility for securing wireless communications in most scenarios. First, the
key must be random and uniformly distributed over the key space. Second, Shannon
showed in 1949 that to ensure perfect secrecy, the length of the secret key must be
at least as long as the message itself [76]. Third, any malicious party that intercepts
the secret key may immediately decrypt the message. Thus, key distribution itself
becomes a security concern: either the key must be generated ahead of time, securely
distributed, and securely stored at the Tx and Rx, or must be independently and
securely generated by both Tx and Rx. Since generating long and identical strings
of truly random symbols at two locations separated in space is not an easy task, the
applicability of the OTP has been limited in practice.
The use of the wireless channel for secret key generation (SKG) has attracted
recent interest. Wireless channels are commonly assumed to be reciprocal, i.e. the
multipath properties are identical in both directions of the link between Tx and Rx,
and temporal variations of the fading coefficients therefore provide a source of com-
mon randomness from which a pair of identical keys can be extracted from various
properties of the channel measurements. Due to its ease of measurement, signal am-
plitude is often used (see, e.g. [62, 54, 99]). SKG methods based on phase differences
[28, 72] and time delay (in wideband transmission) [95, 51] have also been studied.
Fading channels in rich scattering environments (with no significant line of sight com-
ponent) are known also to decorrelate quickly in space; distances greater than half
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a wavelength are commonly assumed to produce significantly uncorrelated channels
[24]. Thus, so long as an eavesdropper (Ex) is not collocated with the Tx or Rx, the
channel can be viewed as a source of randomness not only common but also unique
to the Tx and Rx.
Key bits can be used as a one-time pad (OTP) to perfectly encrypt communication.
Unfortunately, OTP encryption is laden with requirements that restrict its practical
feasibility for securing wireless communications in most scenarios. For channels to
be perfectly reciprocal, both Tx and Rx must measure the channel simultaneously.
Most communications systems are half-duplex, thus in practice measurements at Tx
and Rx are not perfectly reciprocal but rather highly correlated. To generate enough
randomness to form new key bits, the channel must vary sufficiently in time; keys
produced with static terminals, for example, generally have insufficient entropy [35].
Moreover, a channel that varies rapidly may produce sufficient randomness to gener-
ate longer key strings, but also decorrelates in time more rapidly, exacerbating the
imperfect reciprocity. The available secret key length is the mutual information be-
tween the channel estimates [89, 90]. Unfortunately, the amount of key bits that can
be extracted from wireless measurements is generally too low to fully encrypt com-
munication with an OTP [14], and varies with the number of multipath reflections
[89, 90]. Maximization of the achievable secret key rate has been studied in, e.g.
[65, 66].
Alongside opportunistic key generation, another method of secure communica-
tions information-theoretically at the physical layer is possible when the SNR of the
intended receiver is greater than the SNR of the eavesdropper. Goel and Negi [21, 22]
first coined the term artificial noise (AN), and showed that a relative SNR advantage
could be generated without knowing the exact location of the eavesdropper by trans-
mitting noise in a subspace orthogonal to the main channel. For a detailed exposition
of the AN strategy and previous works, refer to Section 3.1. Like SKG, using AN for
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secrecy has its own drawbacks. Power efficiency becomes an issue, since power that
could be used to transmit information is instead used to transmit AN symbols. More-
over, decomposition of the main channel into orthogonal subspaces requires accurate
channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT). Acquiring CSIT is a costly pro-
cess, both in terms of power and time spent; it is simpler to acquire accurate CSI
at the Rx (CSIR) only using, for example, pilot-symbol aided modulation. Channel
estimation error at the transmitter not only leaks artificial noise power into the signal
space, but also potentially leaks additional signal power towards eavesdroppers.
Inaccuracies in CSI have been previously modeled in primarily two ways: chan-
nel quantization and channel perturbation. In [102, 101], CSI is acquired at the Rx
and then a quantized version is fed back to the Tx on a rate-limited public channel.
Our work differs from [102, 101] first in that CSI is kept secret from outside par-
ties and the Tx and Rx are assumed to undergo a reconciliation process to resolve
discrepancies in their estimations (see, e.g. [6]), and second in that the CSI in our
model is not constrained to lie in a predefined finite set of matrices. In this chapter,
we use a channel perturbation model similar to [58]. However, to derive a robust
beamforming technique, [58] assumes that error-free CSIR. We use the perturbation
to model channel evolution in time, and therefore we assume that both Tx and Rx
channel estimates are imperfect. Robust beamforming when the Rx has only a single
antenna is considered in [29] and numerical solutions are found. In this manuscript
we make no attempt to correct for channel error, but rather acknowledge its existence
and quantify its effect on secret communication rates.
5.1.1 Problem Formulation
Secure communication using either SKG or AN requires accurate CSIT. Once the
resources have been used to estimate the channel, the information gleaned from the
process should ideally be exploited to the greatest extent possible. In this chapter
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we show that achievable secrecy rates can be increased beyond the strictly AN case
by exploiting of the redundant channel estimation process required by both AN and
SKG. Though both SKG and AN have been well explored in previous literature, we
know of no previous study that combines the two methods to capitalize upon this
redundancy. We call this system data-carrying artificial noise (DCAN), since the
encrypted symbols exploit the random output properties of an OTP to act as noise,
while still carrying information to the legitimate receiver.
The proposed method is as follows. The Tx and Rx exchange training pulses and
estimate the channel. From this channel estimate they form a common secret key
consisting of a limited number of bits, with which the Tx encrypts none, some, or
all of the message symbols using an OTP.1 Previous studies indicate key rates are
generally low compared communication rates. Therefore we focus on the case where
only a portion of the message symbols can be encrypted. The encrypted symbols
are spatially multiplexed with the remaining unencrypted message symbols and AN
symbols and transmitted. The intended user has the key and can easily decrypt
the encrypted symbols. The output of an OTP is uniformly distributed across the
message alphabet, and therefore is unconditionally secure without the key. Thus the
encrypted symbols act simultaneously as messages to the Rx and interference to the
Ex.
Various studies have been made into the effects of interference in secret commu-
nications. Optimal power allocation in a single-antenna 2 × 2 interference multiple-
access channel is examined in [106]. Our work differs from [106] in that we use spatial
multiplexing and beamforming in a MIMO system to enhance the effects of interfer-
ence and generate higher secret communication rates. In this chapter, we assume that
1The specifics of the SKG process are beyond the scope of this chapter; A SKG algorithm for
fading channels is given in [6], where the Tx and Rx 1) exchange training signals and measure the
channel output, 2) perform error correction to reconcile discrepancies between the measurements,
and 3) perform privacy amplification [4] through one-way hash functions to ensure the Ex remains
ignorant of the final key.
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the transmitted symbols will be nearly Gaussian, so that the symbols are drawn from
a discrete set, but closely approximates Gaussian signaling. With this assumption,
the interference acts as Gaussian noise at the Ex. Gaussian noise is known to be most
detrimental of all distributions of a given variance [55]. Thus encrypted data symbols
can act simultaneously as a information-theoretically secure message to the Rx and
as Gaussian noise to Ex.
As with the AN-only case, the DCAN method we introduce in this chapter offers
a minimum guaranteed secrecy regardless of SNR at the Ex. The net gain of our
proposed scheme can be summarized as follows:
1. Greater information-theoretically secure communication rates, since some secrecy-
guaranteeing artificial noise simultaneously transmits information, and
2. Less power (than the AN-only case) required to achieve a desired secrecy rate,
since some of the message symbols simultaneously act to confuse anyone inter-
cepting communication that does not possess the secret key.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 presents the MIMOME system
model used throughout the chapter. Section studies the achievable secret communi-
cation rates in the case of perfectly known channel stat information (CSI). Section
5.4 derives bounds on secret communication rates assuming that CSI is unknown and
must be estimated. The theoretical rates for both cases are illustrated by numerical
example in Section 5.5. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 5.6.
Notation: The following notation is used throughout the chapter. Bold-face low-
ercase type denotes vector a; bold-face uppercase type denotes matrix A. |A|, AT,
and AH are the matrix determinant, transpose, and Hermitian transpose, respec-
tively. The identity matrix of size p × p is denoted Ip. C is the field of complex
numbers. The entropy of vector x is h(x); conditional entropy given z is h(x|z). The
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mutual information between vectors x and y is I(x; y); mutual information condi-
tioned on z is I(x; y|z). The hat symbol â denotes the estimate of value a. Eχ [·]
denotes expectation with respect to the probability distribution on χ, and cov(w)
denotes the covariance matrix of a vector w. We use diag(x) to mean a matrix with
elements of x along its diagonal and zeros elsewhere; similarly, diag(A1 A2 . . . AK)
is a block-diagonal matrix constructed from A1,A2, . . . ,AK .
5.2 System Model
Define t, r and e as the number of antennas at Tx, Rx, and Ex, respectively. H ∈ Cr×t
is the MIMO main (Tx-Rx) channel matrix, and G ∈ Ce×t is the MIMO eavesdrop-
per (Tx-Ex) channel matrices. The pair (H,G) constitute the MIMOME wiretap
channel. We assume a rich-scattering environment, and assume both channels to be
flat fading and quasi-static such that the channel is constant for the duration of the
channel estimation and subsequent codeword transmission. Thus the entries of H
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG). Note that the rich-scattering assumption is critical to
ensure Eve is not able to glean information during the SKG process and arrive at a
good estimate of the key herself, since experimental studies have shown that, in an
environment with insufficient reflections, signals received at the Ex during the channel
estimation phase can be highly correlated with the main channel [18]. In this chapter
we assume that the Ex is sufficiently distant from both Tx and Rx that it undergoes
independent fading; effects of spatial correlation are studied in, for example, [11, 12].
For fair comparison of different antenna configurations, we normalize the channel
entries [H]i,j ∼ CN (0, 1) such that the average received SNR is independent of number
of transmit antennas. The Tx communicates using a set of constellation points S
that approximates a Gaussian input scheme. The Tx and Rx begin by estimating the
channel and agreeing on a secret key k , [k1 k2 . . . kda ]
T, with ki ∈ S. The Ex is
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assumed sufficiently distant from both Tx and Rx such that its probability of guessing
the key is no better than chance. Define da, db, and dc as the respective number of
OTP, unencrypted and AN symbols transmitted, and the set D , {da, db, dc}.
Let a , [a1 a2 . . . ada ]
T, with ai ∈ S, be the symbol vector to be encrypted with
key k. Define b , [b1 b2 . . . bdb ]
T and c , [c1 c2 . . . cdc ]
T as vectors of unencrypted
and AN symbols, respectively. Alice has t degrees of freedom in designing her transmit
vector, at least e of which must be devoted to interfering with Eve, and at most r of
which can transmit information to Bob. Formally, the requirements on D are
R1. da + db + dc ≤ t
R2. 0 < da + db ≤ r
R3. da + dc ≥ e.
Note that the first inequality in R2 avoids the trivial cases where no information
symbols are transmitted, while R1 ensures that Bob is able to decode all information
symbols sent. The justification for R3 follows the main results.
Define an encryption function fe : S × S → S and decrypting function fd :
S × S → S, and let the perfectly encrypted OTP vector be ǎ = [ǎ1 ǎ2 . . . ǎds ]T,
where ǎi = fe(ai, ki). The OTP key k ensures a one-to-one mapping from symbol to
encrypted symbol given the key symbol, i.e. fd(fe(ai, ki), ki) = ai. Moreover, since
the ki are uniformly distributed over S, it also ensures no information is leaked to
anyone intercepting the encrypted symbol, i.e. I(fe(ai, ki); ai) = 0. Therefore, we
have the two following properties:
h(a|ǎ,k) = 0 (135)
h(a|ǎ) = h(a). (136)

























Using the SVD, the Tx precodes with the right singular vectors to form transmitted
vector x , Vs. The received vectors for the main channel and eavesdropper channel,
respectively, are then
ym = Hx + nm (141)
ye = Gx + ne, (142)
where the channel matrix entries [H]i,j, [G]i,j ∼ CN (0, 1) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . r}, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . t}, nm ∼ CN (0, σ2nmI), and ne ∼ CN (0, σ
2
neI). Let the transmit covariance
matrices corresponding to (137)-(140) above be Qj , VE[jjH]VH for j ∈ {a, ǎ,b, c}.
Let the corresponding powers be Pa = tr(Qa) = tr(Qǎ), Pb = tr(Qb), and Pc = tr(Qc).
Define the set Q , {Qa,Qb,Qc}, and let Q be the set of all Q fulfilling requirements
R1-3 and power constraint Pa + Pb + Pc ≤ P .
5.3 DCAN With Error-Free CSI
In this section, we make the following assumptions about CSI:
A1. Both the Tx and Rx have full, instantaneous, and error-free knowledge of the
main channel matrix H, and know the statistics of the eavesdropper channel G
but have no knowledge of a specific realization.
A2. The Ex has full, instantaneous and error-free knowledge of the eavesdropper
channel G and of the right singular vector matrix V of the main channel.
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Note that in much of the existing AN literature, the worst-case scenario where the
Ex has full knowledge of H is commonly assumed. Since the Ex is able to receive
the training signals from the Tx, she may easily estimate G. However, given suffi-
cient scattering in the environment and spatial separation, it is likely to be overly
pessimistic that the Ex could reliably know H. Any eavesdropper’s best hope of ac-
quiring main-channel state information is to have either Tx or Rx reveal information
to her. This might come in the form of feedback during the main-channel estimation
process. For example, in the LTE standard, the Rx feeds back to the Tx the index
of a quantized version of the precoding matrix V [1]. As a worst-case scenario here,
we assume the Ex has perfect knowledge of V rather than a quantized version.
Given that we reveal V to the Ex, a natural question is whether or not revealing V
might also inadvertently reveal other information about H. This question is addressed
with the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Let the SVD of an n × m matrix B with entries [B]i,j ∼ CN (0, 1) for
all i, j be B = UBΣBV
H
B. Then VB and UB are mutually independent, and are also
individually independent of ΣB.
Proof. Since the entries of B are zero-mean complex Gaussian, the columns of B
are zero-mean complex Gaussian vectors. Therefore, the product BHB is a central
complex Wishart matrix, and has eigenvalue decomposition VBΛBV
H





B. By [85, Lemma 2.6], VB is a Haar matrix uniformly distributed on
the set of m×m unitary matrices, and is therefore independent of ΛB. The proof is
completed by noting that the product BBH is also a central complex Wishart matrix,
and therefore independence similarly applies to left singular matrices UB.
Lemma 1 shows that revealing V to Eve does not risk revealing additional corre-
lated information about the main channel. We can therefore assume that Eve has full
knowledge of V without compromising the information-theoretic security. Given this
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model, with requirements R1-3 and assumptions A1-2, we present the main results of
this chapter in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. In a MIMOME wiretap channel, fix the realization of main and eaves-
dropper channels as H and G, respectively. Then, for any chosen transmit covariance
matrices set Q, the secrecy rate using the DCAN scheme is
RQs (H,G, Q) =
[
log2




|σ2neIe + G(Qǎ + Qb + Qc)G
H|
|σ2neIe + G(Qǎ + Qc)GH|
]+
, (143)
and the maximum is taken over the set Q as
RDCANs (H,G) = max
Q∈Q
RQs (H,G, Q). (144)
Proof. The upper bound on achievable secrecy rates in a Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel is defined as the difference in mutual information between the main and
eavesdropper channels [7] given channels H and G. For DCAN, we assume that the
main channel mutual information is also conditioned on the given realization of secret
key k. Let the SVD of the fixed main channel be H = UΣVH. The achievable secrecy
rates with DCAN are upper bounded by
RDCANs = max
p(x)
[I(a,b; ym|H = H,k)− I(a,b; ye|G,V)]+, (145)
where p(x) is the distribution on transmitted vector x. The first and second terms in
(145) correspond to the main-channel and eavesdropper-channel rates, respectively.
The first term in (145) can be written
I(a,b; ym|H,k) = h(ym|H,k)− h(ym|a,b,H,k) (146)
(a)
= log2|πeQym|H,k| − log2|πeσ2nmI|, (147)
where Qym|H,k = E[ymy
H
m|H,k], and (a) is achieved by choosing a,b Gaussian. Since
the output of the encryption function fe is uniformly distributed over S, we have that
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= HVE[˜̌a˜̌aH|k]VHHH + HQbHH + σ2nmIr (148)
= HQaH
H + HQbH
H + σ2nmIr. (149)
Combining the log terms, we arrive at the first term in (143). The second term in
(145) can be written
I(a,b; ye|G,V) = h(ye|G,V)− h(ye|a,b,G,V)
(b)
= log2|πeQye|G,V| − log2|πeQye|a,b,G,V|
(c)
= log2|σ2neIe + G(Qǎ + Qb + Qc)G
H|
− log2|σ2neIe + G(Qǎ + Qc)G
H|, (150)
where (b) is achieved by designing ǎ,b and c (approximately) Gaussian, Qye|G,V =
E[yey
H
e |G,V], and Qye|a,b,G,V = E[yeyHe |a,b,G,V], and (c) follows from (136). Com-
bining the log terms, the proof is complete.
Corollary 1. In a MIMOME wiretap channel with random main channel H, random







Let Q∗ be a subset of Q with the additional constraints that Pa = 0 and da = 0.
We can then define the strictly AN approach as a special case of the DCAN scheme.
For comparison with previous works, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 1. [22] In a MIMOME wiretap channel with random main channel H,















As SNR at the Ex grows large, the determinant in the denominator of the second
term in (1) is no longer regularized by the noise term. It is noted in [22] that, to
ensure a nonzero determinant, the product GQcG
H be full rank. Thus in the AN-
only case, we have the requirement that dc ≥ e. For the DCAN scheme, we have that
G(Qa + Qc)G
H must be full rank, leading to requirement R3. Clearly, with DCAN,
thwarting Eve requires less degrees of freedom devoted to AN, and more degrees of
freedom can then be used to transmit information. It follows that, in comparison to
the strictly AN case, the DCAN scheme may allow for higher secure data rates or
reduced power expenditure. To show the possible increase in rates over the AN-only
case, we introduce the second Theorem using the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. For any positive-semidefinite matrices A and B with arbitrary but iden-
tical dimension n× n,
|A + B| ≥ |A|. (154)
Proof. See Appendix 5.7.1.
Threorem 2. In a MIMOME wiretap channel with random main channel H, random
eavesdropper channel G, and power constraint P , the maximum ergodic DCAN secrecy
rate R̄DCANs is bounded by
R̄ANs ≤ R̄DCANs ≤ C̄, (155)
where the upper bound is achieved when da = r, the lower bound is achieved when












is the ergodic capacity of the main channel assuming full channel state information
at the transmitter and receiver.
Proof. We first prove the right hand side of (155). Since all product terms inside
determinants in (143) are positive semidefinite, by Lemma 2 we have that
|σ2neIe + G(Qǎ + Qb + Qc)G




|σ2neIe + G(Qǎ + Qb + Qc)G
H|
|σ2neIe + G(Qǎ + Qc)GH|
≥ 0. (158)
Since Qb is a covariance matrix, any nonzero Qb will result in the left hand side of
(158) nonzero, and therefore will yield a rate strictly less than (156). To establish the
equality condition, note that R̄DCANs = C̄ implies (158) is fulfilled with equality. Then
it must be that Qb = 0, which implies that db = 0 and Pb = 0. Thus achieving the
ergodic capacity is possible only by setting Qb to 0 in (156) and allocating power to
Qǎ according to the standard waterfilling solution. Since ergodic capacity is achieved
using all receive antennas, we conclude that da = r.
Next we prove the left hand side of (155). The equality condition is straightforward
by removing the possibility of encrypted symbols, i.e. da = 0 and Pa = 0. This is
the aforementioned subset Q∗ which leads to (152). To establish the inequality, note
that equation (144) is a maximization over Q. Since Q∗ is a subset of Q, any antenna
configuration and power allocation yielding a rate less than (152) will be superseded
by (152) in the maximization; therefore the rate maximized over a larger set can only
yield a greater (or equal) value.
Theorem 2 demonstrates the true utility of the DCAN method, since the achievable
secrecy rates are at least as good as the AN-only scheme, and potentially showing
rates nearing the ergodic channel capacity. The price paid for the increase in secrecy
rates is additional processing in the SKG step; therefore DCAN would be best suited
for systems where secrecy is of utmost importance, even at the expense of complexity.
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Definition 2. The minimum secrecy rate guaranteed to be achievable with DCAN




Definition 3. For a MIMOME system employing DCAN, fix the power PDCAN to
meet the desired secrecy criterion. The power savings of the DCAN approach over an
AN-only strategy with total power PAN is defined as





subject to: R̄ANs ≥ R̄DCANs .
In Section 5.5 we use Definition 2 to demonstrate that DCAN offers greater secrecy
rates than AN only even in the worst case of zero eavesdropper noise, and Definition
3 to illustrate the power saved by choosing DCAN over an AN-only strategy.
5.4 DCAN With Imperfect Channel Estimation
In this section we relax the assumption that error free CSIT and CSIR are instanta-
neously available. Rather, the channel will be decomposed into a known, estimated
part Ĥ and a random error H̃, with H = Ĥ + H̃. We assume that the legitimate
receiver chooses Ĥ to be the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) estimate. With
Gaussian channel inputs, the MMSE estimate is also the linear minimum mean-square
error (LMMSE) estimate. Since the entries of H are ZMCSCG, and using the fact
that for LMMSE estimation the error terms are uncorrelated, the entries of H̃ are
i.i.d. and ZMCSCG with variance σ2
H̃
.
If the statistics of the eavesdropper channel match those of the main channel, then
the eavesdropper channel will also evolve during the SKG process, and the result is
a slight mismatch between the actual and estimated channels at the Ex. Similar to
the main channel, the actual eavesdropper decomposes additively into estimated and






. However, since we are unable to guarantee any estimation fidelity criterion
at the Ex, we will assume the worst case where σ2
G̃
→ 0. Formally, we have the
following modified assumptions:
A1′. Both the Tx and Rx know the estimate Ĥ, and know only the statistics of the
estimation error H̃ and eavesdropper channel G.
A2′. The Ex has full, instantaneous and error-free knowledge of the eavesdropper
channel G and of the right singular vector matrix V̂ of the estimated main
channel.
It is difficult to derive expressions for the achievable rates using DCAN when
the channel must be estimated. However, it is possible to derive upper and lower
bounds on the mutual information between channel inputs and outputs under different
assumptions [55, 100]. We assume the Tx diagonalizes the estimated main channel
using SVD to minimize AN leakage caused by imperfect CSI.2 Let the SVD of the
estimated channel be Ĥ = ÛΣ̂V̂H. Then the message and AN symbols can be
precoded with V̂ to form the transmit vector x = V̂s. Define V̂a, V̂b, V̂ab and
V̂c as the submatrices of V̂ with all rows and selected columns corresponding to
ǎ,b, [ǎT bT ]T and c, respectively. Define Rab = diag(Ra Rb). The output of the
main channel is
zm = Hx + nm, (161)
= (Ĥ + H̃)V̂x + nm (162)
= ĤV̂ab[ǎ
T bT ]T + H̃x + nm, (163)
= ĤV̂ab[ǎ
T bT ]T + wm, (164)
2Although not strictly optimal at low SNR [45], the SVD yields optimal precoding as number
of antennas grows large and at moderate to high SNR. Even in low SNR conditions, SVD offers a
low-complexity precoding approach with nearly-optimal performance
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where (163) is reached by noting that the AN vector c reaches the output only through
the channel estimation error, and where wm = H̃x + nm is the interference plus noise
vector at the Rx. The output at the Ex becomes
ze = GV̂x + ne (165)
= GV̂bb +
(
G(V̂aǎ + V̂cc) + ne
)
(166)
= ĜV̂bb + G̃V̂b + we, (167)
where we =
(
G(V̂aǎ + V̂cc) + ne
)
is the interference plus noise vector at the Ex.
Threorem 3. In a MIMOME wiretap channel with main channel estimate Ĥ, eaves-
dropper channel estimate Ĝ, and power constraint P , the maximum ergodic DCAN
secrecy rate R̄DCANs̃ is bounded by



















|Ie + GV̂bRbV̂Hb GHR−1we|
] ]. (170)
Proof. See Appendix 5.7.2.
Although deriving exact closed-form expressions for the imperfect-CSI case is dif-
ficult, instead of exact expressions we may substitute use of the upper and lower
bounds, so long as the bounds are tight for values of interest. We show by simulation




To verify the DCAN Theorems 1 and 2 presented in Section 5.2, we ran 2 × 103
Monte Carlo simulations using (8, 4, 4) antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively.
To measure the effects of a broad range of Eavesdropper SNR, we tested values of
SNRe = {0, 10, 35, 100} dB. Note that the SNRe = 100 dB case simulates the worst-
case scenario where the Ex has attempted to maximize its SNR by moving close to
the transmitter. For the case of imperfect CSI, our analysis differs fundamentally
from [101, 102], where CSI for the main (MISOSE) channel is quantized to a finite
number of bits, since we assume both Tx and Rx are able to estimate the main
(full MIMOME) channel with sufficient accuracy to form a secret key. Rather, the
imperfect CSI in our system is the result of channel evolution during the overhead
time associated with the key generation process.
In Figure 30, we compare the DCAN scheme with a main-channel SNR of 20 dB
to the corresponding maximum ergodic secrecy rate in the AN-only case for the same
values of Ex SNR, antenna configuration and main-channel SNR. The ergodic AN-
only rate in (152) is selected as the maximum achievable average, allocating signal
power mαP and AN power (1−mα)P , with step size α = 0.02 and m = {0, 1, . . . , 50}.
Although it is well known that, for a MIMO channel with full CSIT, the capacity-
achieving power allocation is achieved via the standard waterfilling solution (see, e.g.
[24, Ch.10.7]), for DCAN the optimality of waterfilling is not clear. Also well known
is the fact that as SNR increases, the waterfilling solution converges to uniform power
allocation. Therefore, at high SNR uniform power allocation is chosen for its simpler
implementation, while at lower SNR we compare the two methods.
The top plot in Figure 30 shows the rates achievable by using DCAN to encrypt
varying numbers of transmitted symbols for the case of uniform power allocation at
low (5 dB) main channel SNR. The results are shown for various eavesdropper SNRs.
To benchmark the success of the scheme, these figures also show the ergodic MIMO
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Figure 30: DCAN achievable rates (solid black lines) with uniform power allocation
(top) and using waterfilling (bottom) for the low SNR case for a MIMOME system
with t = 8, r = 4, and e = 4. Dotted blue lines denote the rates achieved by the
AN-only case defined in (152); solid lines with {©,2,+,×} markers denote rates
achieved with DCAN (151) with respective eavesdropper SNR of {0, 10, 35, 100} dB.
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capacity (horizontal solid line) assuming full CSIT, the same antenna configuration,
and the same transmitted power, as well as rates achievable using only AN (horizontal
dotted lines) for the various values of SNRe tested. Note that the SNRe = 100 line
is nearly indistinguishable from SNRe = 35, and thus can be a good approximation
for the worst case where SNRe →∞.
In each case, the DCAN method is shown to be identical to the AN-only case
when no symbols can be encrypted. The bottom plot in Figure 30 shows the same
curves for the waterfilling solution. As expected, when all symbols are encrypted (i.e.
da = 4), waterfilling yields an available secrecy rate matching the ergodic capacity
of the channel. The interpretation here is that the achievable secrecy is no longer
dependent on the AN symbols, since each information symbol is perfectly encrypted,
but rather is limited by the physical properties of the channel and the Gaussian
receiver noise at the Rx. Similarly, the DCAN curves for uniform power in the top of
Figure 30 show a maximum rate slightly below capacity even when all symbols are
encrypted. Note that, while the rates for waterfilling and uniform power are nearly
identical when SNRe → ∞, uniform power allocation can achieve slightly higher
secrecy rates with moderate SNRe and when a single symbol is encrypted.
Rates for higher (20 dB) main channel SNR, shown in Figure 31, show similar
trends as the low SNR cases, and increase monotonically with each additional en-
crypted symbol. When power is allocated uniformly, we see that the greatest secrecy
gains come invariably from the first encrypted symbol, and gains decrease monotoni-
cally thereafter. This is encouraging, since one of the primary drawbacks of generating
secret keys from randomness in wireless channels is low key bit rate. Our results show
that, even when bit rate is low, encrypting just one symbol can have a dramatic im-
pact on achievable secrecy. This fact is supported on Figure 32, which show the excess
power required by and AN-only system to achieve the same amount of secrecy as the
DCAN scheme for high main-channel SNR. As SNRe grows large, a single encrypted
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Figure 31: DCAN achievable rates in (solid black lines) with uniform power allocation
for the high SNR case for a MIMOME system with t = 8, r = 4, and e = 4. Dotted
blue lines denote the rates achieved by the AN-only case defined in (152); solid lines
with {©,2,+,×} markers denote rates achieved with DCAN (151) with respective
eavesdropper SNR of {0, 10, 35, 100} dB.
symbol saves about 2.5 dB of transmitted power, and each subsequent symbol en-
crypted saves approximately an additional 2 dB. The low main-channel SNR case is
shown on the bottom in Figure 32; it is clear that the benefit from encrypting a single
symbol is even more pronounced.
Simulations for bounds on the DCAN minimum-guaranteed secrecy rate (i.e.,
σ2ne → 0 and σ
2
G̃
→ 0) defined in Theorem 3 are shown in Figure 33. The three
sets of bounds shown are for σ2
H̃
= {.001, .01, .1}. The solid black, solid red hori-
zontal, and solid blue horizontal lines represent the perfect estimation case, ergodic
capacity, and AN-only case for comparison. The bounds are tight for estimation er-
rors below 0.1. As expected, the greater error values shift the overall rate down from
the error-free case. For high main-channel SNR, the overall trend versus number of
encrypted symbols is insensitive to amount of channel estimation error; for low SNR,
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Figure 32: Excess power required for an AN-only scheme to achieve the same secrecy
rate as the DCAN scheme (i.e. power saved by using DCAN), for (a) high, and (b)
low, main-channel SNR with t = 8, r = 4, and e = 4.
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however, the secrecy rate using lower numbers of encrypted symbols is less affected
than the rate at higher numbers.
5.6 Discussion
We have shown how the channel estimation process common to the AN and KG tech-
niques can be leveraged in a MIMOME wiretap channel to enhance achievable secrecy
rates and save power over the AN-only scheme. We demonstrate improvements in
secret communication rates using a simple uniform power allocation strategy. Our
scheme relaxes the common assumption that the eavesdropper has full knowledge
of the main channel fading coefficients, and instead assumes only full knowledge of
the right singular vector matrix. Our results show that partially one-time padding a
message prior to transmission can help protect the remaining unencrypted message,
even in particular when only one message symbol is encrypted.
5.7 Appendices
5.7.1 Appendix 1
By the Minkowsky determinant theorem [56], |A + B|1/n ≥ |A|1/n + |B|1/n. Since A
and B are positive definite, all the eigenvalues for both matrices are strictly positive.
Raising to the power n and noting that the determinant of a matrix is the product
of it eigenvalues, we may then discard cross terms to arrive at |A + B| ≥ |A| + |B|.
Noting again the positive-semidefiniteness of B, it follows that |A|+ |B| ≥ |A|, and
hence |A + B| ≥ |A|.
5.7.2 Appendix 2
To prove Theorem 3, we first derive upper and lower bounds for the main and eaves-
dropper channels separately. The average mutual information of the main channel
given the MMSE estimate can be written
I(a,b; zm|Ĥ) = h(zm|Ĥ)− h(zm|a,b, Ĥ). (171)
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Figure 33: Bounds on the DCAN minimum achievable secrecy rate, for (a) high, and
(b) low, main-channel SNR with t = 8, r = 4, and e = 4. The three sets of bounds
shown are for σ2
H̃
= {.001, .01, .1}. Curves with red “up” arrow markers indicate the
lower bound, and curves with blue “down” markers indicate the upper bound. The
limiting case where σ2
H̃
→ 0 is given by the black curve. The upper horizontal line
shows the ergodic capacity, while the lower horizontal line shows the AN-only case.
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H + Rwm |
]
, (172)
where Rwm = E[(H̃x + nm)(H̃x + nm)
H]. Using the facts that H̃V̂ is equivalent
to H̃ in distribution and that the entries of H̃ are uncorrelated ZMCSCG, the error
covariance matrix simplifies to Rwm = Pσ
2
H̃
I. Since differential entropy is translation
invariant, the second term in (171) can be written
h(zm|a,b, Ĥ) = h(zm − ĤV̂ab[aT bT ]T |a,b), (173)















where expectation in (180) is with respect to H and x for the first and second terms,
respectively.
To derive a lower bound, the mutual information in (171) can equivalently written
I(a,b; zm|Ĥ) = h(a,b|Ĥ)− h(a,b|zm, Ĥ). (175)
Noting the translation invariance of entropy, the second term in (175) can be written
h(a,b|zm, Ĥ) ≤ h([aTbT ]T − [âT b̂T ]|zm, Ĥ) (176)
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for any estimate [âT b̂T ]T . It then follows that
h(a,b|zm, Ĥ)
(d)














where (d) follows from the fact that conditioning can only reduce entropy, (e) follows
from a Gaussian distribution maximizing entropy for a given covariance, and (f)
follows from using the LMMSE estimate.
Since we choose a,b to be Gaussian, the first term in (175) is h(a,b|Ĥ) =
E[log2|πeRab|], and the main channel mutual information lower bound is
I(a,b; ym|Ĥ) ≥ E
[
log2
∣∣I + Rab(ĤV̂ab)HR−1wmĤV̂ab∣∣]. (178)
Thus, we have that the main channel rate R̄m is bounded as R̄
L


















The lower bound on the mutual information in the eavesdropper channel can be
derived by decomposing the mutual information as
I(a,b; ze) = h(a,b)− h(a,b|ze). (181)
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The second term in (181) can be written
h(a,b|ze)
(g)
= h(a|ze) + h(b|a, ze)
(h)
= h(a) + h(b|a, ze)
(i)
= h(a) + h(b|ze)
(j)
= h(a) + h(b− b̂|ze)
(k)
≤ h(a) + h(b− b̂)
(l)
≤ log2|πeRa|+ log2|πe(cov(b− b̂))|, (182)
where (g) uses the chain rule for differential entropy, (h) follows from the fact that,
without the key k, ze contains no information about a, (i) follows from the indepen-
dence of a and b, (j) follows from the translation invariance of entropy, (k) uses the
fact that conditioning can only reduce entropy, and (l) uses the facts that a is Gaus-
sian and that a Gaussian distribution maximizes the entropy for a given covariance.
Since a is independent of b, we have that the joint entropy in the first term in
(181) can be decomposed as h(a,b) = h(a) + h(b). Choosing b̂ to be the LMMSE
estimate yields the lower bound on mutual information
I(a,b; ze) ≥ log2
∣∣Idb + Rb(ĜV̂b)HR−1H̃b+we(ĜV̂b)∣∣, (183)
where RH̃b+we = E[(H̃b + we)(H̃b + we)
H].
To derive the upper bound for the eavesdropper channel, we first show that
I(a,b; ze) ≤ I(a,b; ze|G). Although conditioning can only reduce entropy, no such
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relationship exists for mutual information in general. In this case, we show by sub-
tracting
I(a,b; ze|G)− I(a,b; z) = h(a,b|G)





where (m) is reached noting that G is independent of a,b, and (n) follows from the
fact that conditioning can only reduce entropy.
Using (184), we have that







log2|Ie + GV̂bRbV̂Hb GHR−1we|
]
. (186)
Thus, we have that the eavesdropper channel rate R̄e is bounded as R̄
L
e ≤ R̄e ≤ R̄Ue ,
where
R̄Le = log2
∣∣Idb + Rb(ĜV̂b)HR−1H̃b+we(ĜV̂b)∣∣ (187)
R̄Ue = E
[
log2|Ie + GV̂bRbV̂Hb GHR−1we|
]
. (188)
The proof is completed by assigning R̄Us̃ = R̄
U




In this dissertation, we have presented tools for interference design and two new
methods of design for specific wireless communication systems. Interference channels
are difficult problems both computationally and analytically. However, careful design
of interference can help alleviate problems that arise. When analytical solutions, or
even solutions found through simulation, are over-burdensome, choosing appropriate
approximations in the systems analyzed can make problems more tractable. While
interference is typically though only of as something to be avoided or compensated
for, we have also shown how interference can be designed and used to achieve specific
goals. The specific main contributions of this dissertation are summarized below:
• We proposed a method of analyzing an ad-hoc network interference system to
determine whether a message is likely to be able to cross the network given a
similar network of interference nodes. When using intentional interference to
disrupt a signal, jamming is an attractive choice due to its simple implementa-
tion. However, jamming is costly from a power expenditure standpoint. Ideally,
interference should be designed such that the goal of message disruption is met
with minimal wasted resources. We have presented a method of approximating
an interference network which allows designers to determine how best to select
other system parameters, such as power, number of interference nodes, or node
placement.
• As a second tool in interference design, we proposed an approximation to the
MIMOME artificial-noise secrecy rate using large-scale approximation. This
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approximation was based on random matrix theory in the limit of a large-
antenna system, and allowed calculation of achievable secrecy rates. However,
even though the approximation was derived based on infinite antenna configu-
rations, we showed it to be accurate even for reasonable finite configurations.
We differentiated performance of two approximations, one for the main channel
and one for the eavesdropper channel. Solutions to both channel approxima-
tions were found in closed form. We showed that the overall approximation was
very accurate in mid to high SNR, and provided a speedup of many orders of
magnitude over Monte Carlo simulation.
• We presented a method of designing a fully cooperative communication-radar
system to eliminate interference. We used time-domain zero padding to decou-
ple the training and data signals at the receiver, and showed that both systems
were then able to use low-complexity linear processing to achieve their individ-
ual goals. We presented a new lower bound using a least-squares approach that
bounds the joint system performance when prior knowledge of the channel is
unavailable or inaccurate. Since necessary power levels for the radar system
dwarfed those of the communication system, making real-world amplification
unfeasible, we proposed a PAPR reduction method using Barker sequences to
spread power over multiple training sequences. We showed that Barker se-
quences had almost no effect on the probability of detection, but did decrease
the lower bound on capacity.
• We presented a new DCAN approach to secret communication that combines
two previously studied approaches: secret key generation, and artificial noise.
This new method leverages the noise-like property of secret keys to increase
interference seen by the eavesdropper. DCAN was proven to yield secret com-
munication rates at least as good as the artificial noise alone, and potentially
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reaching ergodic capacity. The first analysis presented assumed that the over-
head in the key generation process was negligible. We then presented a second
analysis assuming that key generation resulted in a Gaussian channel estimation
error of known variance. Upper and lower bounds on the achievable rates using
DCAN were derived, and we then showed the bound to be tight for variance up
to 10% of the variance of the channel.
6.1 Future Research Topics
Addressing interference in wireless communication systems will only become more
important as the number of wireless devices and uses of wireless technologies continue
to proliferate. There are innumerable ways to imagine interference design research
topics, from developing more tools for mitigating system complexity, to developing
additional methods of using interference design to achieve specific goals. Here we list
two potential future directions: one that would be a natural and direct extension of
the research presented in this dissertation, and one entirely new direction (hinted at
in the introduction) that could potentially blossom into a major research topic of its
own.
6.1.1 DCAN in Practical Wireless Systems
One key assumption made in the study of DCAN in Chapter 5 is that the noise
generated is complex Gaussian. While Gaussian noise is known to maximize inter-
ference, a Gaussian distribution does not readily lend itself to a one-time pad, since
continuously distributed symbols require infinite bits to describe. It is therefore of
interest to develop a finite-power signaling scheme that retains maximal ability to
secure communication through interference.
The I-MMSE relation, which relates the derivative of mutual information to the
MMSE of a signaling scheme for a given SNR, has already been identified as a means
to develop a practical finite-power artificial noise interference scheme [3, 64]. This
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relation can be used to determine the effect of a finite signaling constellation on the
effectiveness of the intentional interference. For example, if the Tx were to adopt a
BPSK signaling scheme for the encoded symbols, the Ex could likely estimate the
symbol transmitted and subtract its effect from the remaining symbols, even if no
information could be gleaned from the symbol itself. Finite constellations such as 64-
QAM better mimic the Gaussian distribution in terms of the MMSE [48]. However,
constellations with fine resolution also require more key bits per symbol.
For wiretap channels the eavesdropper channel is by definition unknown at the
transmitter or receiver. However, in broadcast channels with confidential messages,
all users are within the network and therefore all channels are known, including that
of the eavesdropper. Knowledge of the eavesdropper channel facilitates many analyses
not possible in the wiretap channel. For example, finding the optimal power allocation
becomes more feasible using the generalized singular-value decomposition (GSVD) to
compute the singular values for the joint set of main and eavesdropper channels.
6.1.2 Secrecy with Blind Interference Alignment (BIA)
Designing interference to align onto a small subspace of the signal space at the in-
tended receiver(s) in wireless communication systems has gained interest over the
last decade. This technique, known as interference alignment (IA), has been shown
to increase the degrees of freedom (DoF), i.e. independent signaling dimensions, avail-
able for communication beyond that possible using orthogonal interference mitigation
techniques (i.e. code, time or frequency division). For example, in a system with K-
user single-antenna pairs (referred to as the “X-Channel”), orthogonal approaches
yield 1/K interference-free DoF per user. This is often referred to metaphorically
as each user getting an equal 1/K slice of the total DoF “cake.” In contrast, the
same K-user system using IA asymptotically yields 1/2 DoF per user, i.e. each user
gets 1/2 of the cake [8]. Previous works (e.g. [50, 31]) have also considered IA for
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the symmetric MIMO X-Channel where transmitters and receivers are equipped with
the same number of antennas. The extension to the general MIMO X-channel case,
where transmitters and receivers have different numbers of antennas, is considered in
[26].
For IA to be possible, the dimension of the total signal space must be large enough
to contain both intended signal and interference in (nearly) disjoint subspaces. In a
MIMO system, the necessary dimensions are provided by the antennas. This allows
implementation of IA for a single instance in time. In the single-antenna case, the
dimensionality of the signal space must be increased using symbol extensions, i.e.
transmitting over multiple time instances or frequency bands. Maximum DoF are
achieved by coding over an infinite number of symbol extensions, but even a finite
number of symbol extensions yields greater DoF than orthogonal approaches [8].
The concept of ergodic interference alignment was presented in [59]. With ergodic
alignment, blocks are coded over long intervals, and dimensionality requirements are
fulfilled by the channel’s continuous (commonly termed “generic” in the literature)
nature. By waiting long enough, natural variations in the channel will eventually
produce the necessary alignment conditions almost surely. The disadvantage to this
approach, clearly, is that block lengths can grow quite long in the process.
One of the major limitations of the IA scheme is the need for global channel
knowledge for all the users, i.e. each transmitter must have not only knowledge of its
own channel, but also knowledge of the channels of all other users in the system. Blind
interference alignment (BIA) was first presented as a solution to this major limitation
in [33]. With BIA, users have no knowledge of the actual channel coefficients; rather,
statistics of the channels (specifically, the coherence time and bandwidth) are assumed
to be globally known. In [32], it is shown that BIA is achievable only when the users
channels are selective in different ways; if one user’s channel is frequency selective,
the other must be time selective (and vice versa). Instead of relying on channel
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fluctuations produced by the natural environment, BIA can also be achieved using
antenna switching at the transmitter to generate short-term channel fluctuation [27].
The idea of BIA hinges on the assumption that the main and eavesdropper chan-
nels are known to be oppositely selective, i.e. if the main channel is frequency selective
then the eavesdropper channel is time selective, and vice versa. This is equivalent to
stating that if one channel has a short (long) coherence time, the other will have a
small (large) coherence bandwidth. It was shown in [32] that using only knowledge
of the channel coherence relative to the other, it is possible to align interference to
lie in a small dimensional (time-frequency) subspace for each user. Using this same
assumption, it is possible that a special case of BIA can be implemented to ensure
privacy in a broadcast channel with confidential messages with two users of differing
channel types. It is straightforward to show that each user’s message would collapse
onto a smaller subspace at the other user for certain channels (e.g. the 2-user MISO
channel with 2 transmit and 1 receive antennas). The challenge would be to prove
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